

## VII: The Wall

The enduring problem of the DDR was its utter inability to engender the loyalty of more than a small minority of its citizens. This was, in part, a self-inflicted wound--the product of repression, mismanagement, and the ruthless Sovietization of the economy--in part a reaction to the clearly collaborative nature of the regime and its abject subordination to Moscow. Then, too, East Germans were confronted daily with the example of the Federal Republic, where a liberal democratic state presided over a burgeoning economy that ultimately combined social responsibility with an unprecedented level of prosperity. Within a few years of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, it was apparent to German Marxists that whatever hopes they might have had that it would become a worker's paradise were misplaced. The East German regime remained unable or unwilling to respond positively to the permanent, widespread disaffection of its citizenry. From at least the summer of 1953 onward, the Communist regime survived only through the institution of increasingly thorough instruments of internal repression.

From the perspective of East German President Ulbricht and the leadership of the SED (Sozialistische Einheits Partei Deutschland), the latent popular hostility to the Communist regime was most damaging in the steady hemorrhage of refugees from east to west. Between 1949 and 1961 more than 2.7 million East Germans "voted with their feet," leaving East Germany for the Federal Republic, many of them escaping through West Berlin.

In 1958 Ulbricht appealed to the Soviet Union for help, but this was not a problem that Moscow could solve. The Kremlin had economic difficulties of its own and could not afford the kind of massive, continuing aid demanded by the East German leadership. Moreover, nothing would persuade the millions of disaffected East Germans to remain, so long as it was not only more promising, but easier to simply abandon the poverty and repression of the DDR and decamp for the West. In the end, Ulbricht finally put an end to the mass exodus by sealing off the borders. This happened over the night of 12-13 August 1961, when East German troops halted traffic and strung barbed wire along the border separating East from West Berlin. Over the next few months this barrier was expanded and improved to become the Berlin Wall, soon to be the universal symbol of the Cold War and of the Soviet tyranny imposed on Eastern Europe. But from first to last it was an East German project, built and maintained by the DDR.

In West Berlin, the closing of the sector borders was not completely unexpected--although the thoroughness, secrecy, and speed with which the East Germans erected their barrier caught everyone off-balance. Washington's first priority was to calm the situation in West Berlin, where the populace was daily confronting the East German guards in massed demonstrations at the now-closed sector borders. There was, of course, little short of war that the US could do to force the East Berlin government to open its border, but, in response to an urgent request by West Berlin Mayor Willi Brandt, President John F. Kennedy ordered that the West Berlin garrison be augmented. Kennedy also dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and former military governor Lucius D. Clay to the scene. With the West Berlin government thus reassured, the tension slowly eased.

The construction of the Berlin Wall came at the end of a season of rising international tension. The new Kennedy administration had been humiliated by the Bay of Pigs fiasco that April. In June, Khrushchev tried to bully the Western powers into abandoning Berlin during his Vienna summit with President Kennedy, and on 3 August--days before the Wall went up--he once again threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the DDR.

Intelligence concerning the sources of Khrushchev's conduct did not make the situation look any less dire. Midsummer reporting from Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, the CIA's agent inside the Soviet General Staff, explained Khrushchev's belligerence as the product of Politburo dissatisfaction over his handling of the Berlin situation in general. Threatened with outright deposition, Khrushchev was engaging in brinkmanship to reassert his credibility as a dynamic leader. Penkovskiy followed up his initial report on 20 September, when he met with his CIA contacts in Paris, to warn them of plans to use massively augmented Warsaw Pact military exercises as a cover for military action against the Federal Republic. The signing of a separate peace treaty with the DDR was to be announced at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October. <sup>7</sup> This last report was examined warily in yet another SNIE considering Soviet tactics regarding Berlin.<sup>8</sup> Western policymakers looked to the coming of Autumn with considerable misgivings.

But Ulbricht's construction of the Berlin Wall already had provided the decisive action needed to defuse the situation. Khrushchev did not, in the end, come forward with his proposed peace treaty, but went off on another tangent, using the Party Congress as a forum to denounce the USSR's erstwhile ally, the People's Republic of China! Neither did the anticipated Soviet military exercises occur in East Germany. Instead, tension peaked over 27-29 October with a confrontation between Soviet and US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. Europe briefly seemed on the brink of war, but after a few days first the Soviet and then the American tanks slowly withdrew. As the noise of their diesel motors faded, so did Berlin's role as the focal point of the Cold War.

Looking back, the tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie seems little more than an anticlimax--at least insofar as the intelligence war was concerned. The construction of the Berlin Wall put an end to the classical period of intelligence activity in Cold War Berlin. With one stroke, Ulbricht's action neutralized the effect of the Western intelligence presence while simultaneously solving the refugee problem and stabilizing the Communist regime. Intelligence activities did not cease with the construction of the Berlin Wall, but with ready access to the East cut off, the value of the city as a base of operations was considerably diminished.

The Wall thus achieved much of what the Soviets and East Germans had been trying to do since the creation of the quadripartite regime in 1945. Khrushchev accordingly claimed a triumph, but, ironically, the Wall was built just as photoreconnaissance satellites and other sophisticated technical means of collection were undercutting Berlin's importance as a strategic intelligence base deep inside Soviet territory. After August 1961 the intelligence activities in the city gradually faded from the limelight, but it is difficult to say whether this happened because the East Germans had eliminated its usefulness as an intelligence base or whether Berlin was simply superseded by more sophisticated and reliable means of collecting strategic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc.

Those most affected by the construction of the Wall were of course the inhabitants of Berlin. The wall

not only stopped the flow of refugees, it cut the economic links between East and West Berlin, depriving thousands of East Germans of their livelihoods. On the other hand, the newly stabilized supply of labor gave the East German economy a needed boost: literally for the first time since World War II, producers in East Germany could be reasonably certain that skilled employees would be in their jobs from one week to the next. By the mid-1960s, East Germany was enjoying a period of relative prosperity.

West Berliners continued to prosper throughout it all, albeit with the aid of considerable support from the Bonn government. Aided by the narrow windows that gradually opened up to the West, East Berliners lived their lives as best they could in the German Communist state. But the Wall remained. Some East Germans at first tried to escape clandestinely, but as the barrier was steadily reinforced with gun towers, dogs, and minefields, escape became riskier and the chances of success faded. Even so, 600 to 700 people continued to make the attempt each year.

VII-1: Memorandum for the DDI: Subject: The Berlin Situation, 1 November 1957 (MORI No. 44001).

This CIA memorandum raised the possibility that the Soviets might abrogate the Quadripartite Agreements and seal the "sector borders" between East and West Berlin as a means of applying pressure on the Western Allies.

VII-2: CIWS: East Germany May Move Against Berlin Sector "Border Crossers" 28 May 1959 (MORI No. 45598).

Before the Wall was built, the economies of East and West Berlin were interwoven, with many East Berliners dependent upon income from jobs in West Berlin's more vibrant economy. The East German regime saw this as a drain on their own struggling economy. The possibility that East Germany (not the Soviet Union) might restrict movement between East and West Berlin thus became an issue in the course of the Berlin crisis.

VII-3: CIWS: Soviet Policy on Berlin and Germany, 11 May 1961 (MORI No. 28202).

This review of Soviet policy regarding Berlin stresses the political importance for Khrushchev of reaching an agreement on Berlin during 1961.

VII-4: SNIE 2-61: Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action Regarding Berlin, 13 June 1961.

This edition for the first time considers the East Germans as actors alongside their Soviet allies.

VII-5: Oleg Penkovskiy: Meeting No. 23, 28 July 1961 (MORI No. 12409)

Oleg Penkovskiy, the CIA's agent inside Soviet military intelligence and on the General Staff, was privy to information at the highest levels of the Soviet military. In this oral report, delivered on 20 July 1961, he describes the internal tensions undermining Khrushchev's position in the Politburo as they applied to the Berlin situation. Penkovskiy did not have the direct access to the Soviet decisionmaking process that this report implies. However, he was very knowledgeable concerning General Staff matters and often was informed about high-level political decisions by his patron, Marshal Sergei Sergeyevich Varentsov. The intelligence he provided to CIA was valued very highly.

Penkovskiy began spying for the West early in 1961. Over the next 18 months he made several trips to the West, each time meeting clandestinely with his handlers. The following excerpt is from the transcript of one of those meetings. Penkovskiy is identified as "S."

VII-6: CIWS: Berlin, 17 August 1961 (MORI No. 28205).

Five days after the Wall went up, this report summarizes developments over 12-17 August.

VII-7: SNIE 11-10-61: Soviet Tactics in the Berlin Crisis, 24 August 1961.

A survey of Soviet policy in light of the changed situation in Berlin and the DDR.

VII-8: CIWS: Berlin, 24 August 1961 (MORI No. 28206).

A more detailed look at developments in Berlin and East Germany.

VII-9: CIWS: Berlin, 7 September 1961 (MORI No. 28211).

In the month following the construction of the Berlin Wall, the East German regime initiated a general crackdown to further the "Sovietization" of East Germany and threatened to restrict Western access to Berlin by air.

VII-10: Memorandum for Washington on Berlin, 14 September 1961 (MORI No. 14414).

The construction of the Wall had profound implications for the conduct of intelligence operations in Berlin. These are detailed in a memorandum sent to Washington.

VII-11: Penkovskiy, Meeting No. 31, 22th September 1961, paras. 17-25 (MORI No. 12412).

Meeting with his CIA handlers on 20 September 1961, Penkovskiy passed important information regarding Khrushchev's contingency plans for military action that Autumn. See Document VII-13, below. "Varentsov" is Marshal Sergei Sergeyevich Varentsov, Penkovskiy's patron on the Soviet General Staff. In this transcript, Penkovskiy is again identified as "S."

VII-12: Memorandum for the Record: Subject: Conversation with Mr. Helms Re [ ] Report on Large-Scale Soviet Military Preparations, 26 September 1961 (MORI: 12292).

VII-13: SNIE 11-10/1-61: Soviet Tactics in the Berlin Crisis, 5 October 1961.

Upon receipt of Penkovskiy's information concerning Khrushchev's plans for the coming fall, the Board of National Estimates prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) devoted entirely to evaluating his information--a highly unusual procedure. Of particular interest is the nuanced approach to Penkovskiy's report.

VII-14: Dispatch: Berlin Since 13 August, 6 November 1961 (MORI No. 14411).

A look at Berlin in the months immediately after the Wall went up.

VII-15: Memorandum for the DCI; Subject: Survivability of West Berlin [in the Event of a Soviet Blockade in Response to the Blockade of Cuba], 23 October 1962 (MORI No. 9409).

The Cuban Missile Crisis raised concerns that the Soviets might retaliate for the blockade of Cuba with a similar action directed against Berlin. Here, the Board of National Estimates reviews West Berlin's ability to withstand another blockade.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
1 November 1957

OCI No. 5535/57

Copy No.

TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: The Berlin Situation

There have been several reports in the past week that the Berlin sector borders will be sealed, thus abrogating Berlin's status as a Four-Power city. In this connection, according to the latest information, preparations reportedly have been made which would enable additional trains to operate from Potsdam to East Berlin using the outer ring, bypassing West Berlin.

According to an unconfirmed report East Berlin-Potsdam traffic is to be routed over the Berlin Outer Ring and the wooden S-Bahn stations near the sector border at Baumschulenweg and Friedrichstrasse are to be reactivated. This suggests that S-Bahn traffic through West Berlin is to be greatly restricted to permit customs checks at the wooden stations which were specifically designed for customs checking purposes when built two or three years ago. Steamdriven trains via Baumschulenweg to Potsdam over the Outer Ring could be used to carry passengers to Potsdam. This would restrict, but not eliminate S-Bahn traffic service in West Berlin.

Recent East German harrassments have included increased controls over interzonal trains consisting of thorough searches of cargoes, removal of a number of mail cars from trains, and confiscation of parcel post and freight shipments. Highway traffic has been subjected to delays and intensive searches of passengers and cargoes. Threats have been made by the East Germans that they may assume control over the air corridors to Berlin.

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Soviet interference with Allied traffic has been sporadic and inconsistent. Negotiations on new documentation procedures have been in progress for some time, but the Russians continue to raise objections to Allied procedures on a variety of pretexts.

The East Germans and the Russians have the capability to seal both the zonal and sector borders without prior warning if they should decide to take such a drastic step. An example was the East German regime's 13 October currency conversion with complete secrecy. In connection with the conversion, the regime sealed the Berlin sector borders, and stopped all autobahn traffic between West Germany and Berlin.

This series of harassments of Berlin has been undertaken by the East German regime apparently with the purpose of eroding the Allied position there and establishing East German authority over its zonal territory and East Berlin.

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OCI NO. 2322/60  
28 May 1960

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

28 May 1960

PART II (continued)

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
Page 3

EAST GERMANY MAY MOVE AGAINST BERLIN SECTOR "BORDER CROSSERS" . . . . .

Page 4

The East German regime may be preparing a drive against the estimated 40,000 persons who live in East Berlin and work in the Western sector of the city. The East German Government has charged that many of these "border crossers" are engaged in illegal currency manipulations and in smuggling of goods in both directions. An all-out campaign at this time would not be in the Communists' interests, however, since it would tend to increase tensions and emphasize a determination to abrogate the four-power status of the city by unilateral action.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

28 May 1959

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EAST GERMANY MAY MOVE AGAINST BERLIN SECTOR "BORDER CROSSERS"

The East German regime may be preparing a drive against persons who live in East Berlin and work in the Western sector, according to unconfirmed reports from Berlin.

Such a drive against these "border crossers" would have one or more of the following purposes: a) to isolate West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany; b) to renew pressures on the West Berlin government to negotiate on this issue; c) to force skilled workers living in East Berlin to take jobs in East Berlin or East Germany in order to relieve

the serious labor shortage and fill positions opening up in East Germany's expanding industry; and d) to eliminate or reduce the present uncontrolled transactions in East German currency at other than official rates.

The Communists are not likely to undertake an all-out campaign at this time, however, since it would tend to increase tensions and emphasize a determination to abrogate the four-power status of the city by unilateral action. Under Berlin's present status, all residents have a right to move freely to any part of the city.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

28 May 1959

An estimated 40,000 residents of East Berlin or East Germany now work in the Western sector, an increase of some 6,000 since 1957, while during the same period the number of West Berlin residents working in East Berlin declined from approximately 16,000 to about 13,000. The East German Government has admitted that many border crossers are engaged in illegal currency manipulation and in smuggling of goods in both directions. Under present arrangements the East-to-West border crossers receive 40 percent of their wages in West marks and the remainder in East marks at a 6-to-1 rate. The West-to-East crossers are permitted to exchange 80 percent of their wages into West marks at the official 1-to-1 rate. Since the present free-market rate of exchange is about 3.5 East marks to 1 West mark, the border crossers can realize a tidy bonus.

In addition to the advantages of the currency situation and the opportunity to shop in both parts of the city, there are other reasons why many residents of East Berlin continue to live there. One of the most important is the continued housing shortage in both parts of the city, despite the vast amount of building in West Berlin. If a person has a house, even in East Berlin, he will try to keep it rather than move to West Berlin through refugee channels and go to the bottom of the long list of people waiting for housing.

The East German regime undertook brief intensive campaigns in 1957 and in 1958 to reduce the number of border crossers. The major result of such campaigns was to induce the border crossers to make a permanent move to West Berlin or West Germany. A new drive at this time probably would have a similar result.

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PART IV

NOTES AND COMMENTS

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COPY NO.  
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11 May 1961

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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Date 17 OCT 1986

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## SOVIET POLICY ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

The crisis over Berlin precipitated by Khrushchev on 10 November 1958 was the logical extension of the policies developed by the Soviet leaders following the Western decision in 1955 to accord full sovereignty to West Germany and bring it into the NATO alliance. Having failed to block these developments, Moscow adopted a new course aimed at gaining Western acceptance of the concept of two Germanys.

Its initial move in this direction was to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn in September 1955. The USSR then concluded a state treaty with Ulbricht's regime granting it all the attributes of sovereignty except control over Allied access to West Berlin. Next, Molotov at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference in November 1955 rejected reunification of Germany by means of free elections and declared that unification was possible only through a rapprochement between the two German states.

Thereafter the USSR took the position that a peace treaty should be negotiated with and signed by the two German states. Previously, the Soviets had said a treaty would be concluded with a reunified Germany. This new approach still left two significant issues unresolved: the status of Berlin and the conclusion of a final peace settlement. Therefore the final step in this policy was the crisis over Berlin and the Soviet demands for a peace treaty with East and West Germany and a "free city" in West Berlin.

Berlin Crisis: 1958-60

Khrushchev's aim was to confront the Western powers with the apparent dilemma of risking war to maintain their existing rights in Berlin or making concessions which would erode their position not only in Berlin but

also on the question of German unification. In addition to using the Berlin threat as a lever for overcoming Western resistance to a summit meeting under conditions favorable to the USSR, Khrushchev's strategy was to manipulate the Berlin issue as a means of wringing concessions from the West which could lead eventually to some form of recognition of the East German regime and to acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

Since May 1959, when negotiations opened at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, Khrushchev's fundamental goal has been not to drive Western forces out of Berlin within some brief period but to bring about a basic change in the legal status of the city. Such a change, in Moscow's view, would seriously undermine the Western powers' long-standing insistence that their rights in Berlin--based on the unconditional surrender of Germany--continue until Germany is reunified by four-power agreement.

The Soviet position, therefore, has consisted of two main elements: an offer to negotiate a modification in Berlin's status, and a threat to take unilateral action if no agreement is reached. Moscow's initial demand for the creation of a free city and all subsequent amendments, including a compromise solution for an interim period, have aimed at liquidating Western rights to remain in Berlin without restrictions pending German unification. Since the West has no interest in negotiating away its rights, Moscow has used dead-ends, either explicit or implicit, to guarantee continuing Western interest in discussing the issue in order to avoid a crisis.

The breakdown of the summit conference in Paris confronted

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Khrushchev with the choice of carrying out his threat against Berlin and accepting the high risks involved or deferring action until a further round of negotiations could be attempted with a new American administration. His choice of the latter course reflected not only his preference for a policy of limited risks but also his confidence that the forces which brought about the Paris meeting were still operative in the West.

Soviet restraint, however, did not preclude attempts by the East Germans to undermine the Western position in Berlin by imposing arbitrary restrictions on the movements of West Germans into East Berlin. In the face of West German economic retaliation, the Communists gradually retreated and accepted a compromise settlement of the issue, partly because of the potential economic disruption which would result from a break in trade but also because of Khrushchev's desire not to jeopardize the chances for an early meeting with the new President.

Khrushchev also used this period between the summit conference and the change of administrations to spell out his future course. He began to lay the groundwork for new high-level negotiations on Berlin in his discussion with Prime Minister Macmillan in New York last fall. He told the prime minister that the heads of government would have to discuss Germany and Berlin and that the Soviet Union would sign a treaty with East Germany if the West refused to reach agreement. He said that, in any case, the question of Germany must be settled during 1961. Khrushchev made this position public on 20 October and informed West German Ambassador Kroll that postponement of a solution beyond the West German elections, scheduled for this September, would be unacceptable.

In a recent conversation with Kroll, Khrushchev modified his earlier timetable. While strongly emphasizing his determination to achieve a solution during 1961, Khrushchev stated that the bloc had set no precise deadlines and would be willing to wait until the West German elections and "possibly" until the Soviet party congress in October before convening a bloc peace conference to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. He said also that the prospects of a showdown over Berlin "need not affect negotiations already begun with the US" and that he was willing to give the President more time.

This line and Khrushchev's repeated assurances in his recent interview with Walter Lippmann that he recognized that the President needed time to consolidate his position suggest that Khrushchev's future course is still closely tied to his desire to hold a high-level meeting on Berlin, either bilaterally with the US or at another four-power summit conference. At the same time, these statements probably reflect the Soviet leaders' awareness that East-West negotiations on Berlin will require considerably more time than Khrushchev anticipated after the summit breakdown and in private conversations last winter.

#### The Soviet Position


The USSR's maximum demands have remained essentially unaltered since first spelled out in the notes of 27 November 1958 and 10 January 1959; they were most recently restated in Moscow's memorandum to Bonn on 17 February 1961. The USSR proposes to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and to transform West Berlin into a demilitarized free city. This position was modified slightly at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, when Gromyko proposed that "symbolic" units of the four

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powers could be stationed in the free city.



The repeated references to the necessity of confirming the postwar situation in Europe, although designed in part to present Soviet demands in a reasonable light, also reflect the Soviet leaders' preoccupation with firmly establishing the international position of the East European regimes through a treaty freezing the partition of Germany and recognizing the East German boundaries as permanent international frontiers.

Khrushchev is well aware that the growing strength of West Germany poses a serious political, economic, and military challenge to the Ulbricht regime and to the East European governments bordering on Germany. By demanding a peace treaty, a free city, and complete East German control over communications to Berlin, Khrushchev is seeking to deal a decisive blow to Bonn's aspirations for unification and to undermine its confidence in the strength and unity of the Western alliance.

In his talks with Lippmann, however, Khrushchev indicated that he does not hold any great expectations for Western acceptance of a peace treaty with both Germans. Recent Soviet

statements provide strong evidence that Moscow instead will concentrate on obtaining a temporary or interim solution for Berlin. The memorandum to Bonn stated as much, and Khrushchev told Lippmann that such an interim solution was a Soviet "fallback" position. Khrushchev made it clear, however, that the USSR would press for an agreement abolishing Western occupation rights at the end of the interim period. The revival of the interim concept, well in advance of any negotiations, suggests that Moscow sees this as the only proposal realistic enough to gain Western agreement.

The interim agreement as originally outlined at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference has three main advantages for the USSR: 1) a strictly defined time limit, which would permit Moscow to reopen the question with a stronger legal and political position; 2) the implication that the Western powers remained in Berlin at the sufferance of the USSR; and 3) the link between an interim agreement and the establishment of an all-German negotiating body. In effect, the Soviet leaders hoped to induce the West to accept a revision of Berlin's status in the direction of the free city proposals in return for permission to maintain troops in and to have free access to Berlin for a limited period.

At Geneva, Foreign Minister Gromyko refused to clarify the status of Western rights at the end of this period and proposed only that negotiations be resumed with "due regard" to the situation prevailing at that time. The interim agreement, therefore, was intended as a stage leading toward the ultimate withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. This position was made clear shortly before the Paris summit meeting, when Moscow proposed in a note to De

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Gaulle that the interim period last for 'two years,' but that at the end of the period the four powers would be committed to sign a peace treaty and "take measures" to create a free city in West Berlin.

A constant element in all Soviet formulations for a temporary solution of Berlin's status has been the proposal to convene an all-German commission to negotiate on unification and a peace treaty while the interim agreement was in effect. Khrushchev has privately conceded that he realized that such negotiations would probably fail, but the USSR has insisted on this proposal as a means of gaining Western endorsement of the thesis of two sovereign German states and their exclusive right to deal with unification.

The other points of an interim agreement--duration, abolition of propaganda activities, prohibition of nuclear weapons in West Berlin, and reduction of Western troops--are essentially bargaining counters. East German statements have listed various terms for "normalizing" the situation, including cessation of recruitment in West Berlin for the West German forces, termination of the West German Government's official activities there, and a "progressive reduction" of Western forces. As to the duration, Khrushchev is quoted by Lippmann as mentioning "perhaps two to three years," which could mean an extension of the last formal proposal--before the Paris summit--for a two-year agreement.

Conclusions

Despite Khrushchev's repeated expressions of skepticism

regarding the West's willingness to resort to a nuclear war over Berlin, his actions during the past two and a half years suggest that a margin of doubt exists in his estimate of the Western response in a crisis, and that he still prefers a negotiated solution. Recent Soviet statements stressing the urgency of the German question suggest that a formal demarche to renew negotiations may be made in the relatively near future. Khrushchev probably would contend that the Western powers, after the abortive summit conference, committed themselves to reconvene the meeting and would cite his conversation with Macmillan as proof.

In any negotiations which take place in the next few months, Moscow might reduce some of its demands for an interim settlement rather than allow the talks to collapse. The main purpose of a limited agreement, however, would still be to document the Soviet contention that existing Allied rights are void and to establish the presumption that further steps would be taken to adjust the status of West Berlin.

If the West refused to negotiate, Khrushchev would probably feel compelled to conclude a separate treaty. His long and continuing commitments to take this action probably act as a form of pressure either to demonstrate gains by negotiations or to carry out his repeated pledges to resolve the situation in Berlin by unilateral action. At any rate, Khrushchev has committed himself to a solution during 1961.

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13 JUN 1961

*SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO VARIOUS  
COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING BERLIN



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Submitted by the

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

Concurred in by the

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 13 June 1961\* Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

*\*This estimate was approved by the USIB on 13 June 1961, subject to certain further action by USIB representatives, consulting as necessary with their principals (USIB-M-159, item 4). This latter action was completed on 19 June 1961.*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 June 1961.

SUBJECT: SNIE 2-61: SOVIET AND OTHER REACTIONS TO VARIOUS  
COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING BERLIN

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet and other reactions to four courses of Allied (US, UK, and France) action in the event of an unacceptable degree of Soviet or East German interference with Western access to West Berlin. The courses of action are: (a) a substantial effort to maintain ground access to West Berlin by a limited military action; (b) a substantial effort to maintain air access; (c) other pressures and reprisals against the USSR and East Germany; and (d) large-scale preparations for general war.

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SCOPE NOTE

This estimate is a revision of SNIE 100-6-59, dated 6 April 1959.<sup>1/</sup> The courses of action considered in that estimate have been altered and expanded in the present paper.

THE ESTIMATE

1. It is now two and one-half years since the USSR projected the Berlin issue into the forefront of East-West contention. During this period the USSR has persisted with great seriousness in its attempts to bring about a change in the status of the city. At the same time, the intervening events have almost certainly caused the Soviet leaders to increase considerably their estimate of the importance attached by the US to the Western position in Berlin and of the lengths to which the US would go to defend it.

2. During this same period, attitudes in France, the UK, and West Germany have also undergone some change. On the one hand, the sense of vulnerability in these countries has grown with advances in Soviet weaponry and corresponding increases in Soviet confidence and assertiveness. On the

<sup>1/</sup> SNIE 100-6-59, "Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis," dated 6 April 1959, TOP SECRET, LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

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other hand, these countries have drawn encouragement from the fact that the Soviets, at least to date, have been unwilling to implement threats which initially seemed to foreshadow immediate encroachments. There has also been time for the Western Powers to explore the Soviet position and to canvass a variety of possible concessions which might accommodate the USSR without jeopardizing the essentials of the Western position. This process has led to a wide measure of agreement that the Soviet purpose is, ultimately, absorption of the city by the GDR rather than some lesser objective.

3. Nevertheless, while much has been clarified, much remains uncertain. In particular, each side finds it difficult to reach a confident judgment of the point at which the other would be willing to run substantial military risks over Berlin. In these circumstances, the USSR will almost certainly continue its efforts to induce the Allies to negotiate their own gradual departure from the city. Throughout these maneuvers, however, the Soviet leaders will be continually reassessing the willingness of the three Western Powers to defend their interests with force. In this appraisal, they will consider the official positions and military dispositions of the Allied governments. But they will also have to make judgments about

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intangibles -- the willingness of each government to disregard or be guided by the advice of its partners; the degree to which each is influenced by domestic public opinion; the readiness of each, in a moment of crisis, to assume risks which may run as high as general nuclear war.

4. In deciding when and how to move against Allied access to Berlin, the Soviet leaders will seek to turn these factors to their own advantage. They will precede any such move with diplomatic measures designed to demonstrate that they are resorting to unilateral action only after all other alternatives have been exhausted. These measures may include another round of negotiations and, almost certainly, a separate peace treaty with the GDR intended to provide both another warning and another occasion for the Allies to reconsider their position.

5. Even after these steps have been accomplished, the USSR and the GDR almost certainly will not explicitly deny access to Berlin. Instead, they will simply make Allied access subject to certain new conditions, beginning presumably with the replacement of Soviet by East German controllers in the access procedures. They will almost certainly not attempt at the same time to close off Berlin from West German civilian access, which is already under East German control. Thus the

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USSR will hope to make it as difficult as possible for the Allied governments to conclude that the new situation is a clear-cut denial of access, to agree among themselves on strong countermeasures, and to justify these to their populations.

6. In spite of such Soviet efforts, however, there has been, according to the terms of our problem, an "unacceptable" degree of interference with Western access to Berlin. It is assumed that the US, UK, and France have therefore agreed in undertaking one or more of the stated courses of action.<sup>2/</sup> The subsequent course of the crisis would be heavily influenced by the particular context of events at the time when access was interfered with. Further, the exact nature of tactical moves, and the manner in which they were made, would have important effects on the way in which each side assessed the continuing resolution and intentions of the other. An added difficulty is that we necessarily treat each course first in isolation, although we recognize that its effect might be greater if it were combined with other actions. We have therefore attempted only to describe the basic factors

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<sup>2/</sup> It should be stressed that this assumption is by no means an estimate of British and French willingness to agree to all of these courses of action.

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underlying Soviet and other reactions to these courses, recognizing that these reactions will also be influenced by specific elements of the situation which cannot now be foreseen.

COURSE A: A substantial effort to reopen and maintain ground access by a limited military action -- defined as the utilization of up to two reinforced divisions with tactical air support in readiness if required. The force would proceed on the autobahn toward Berlin. If its movement was opposed, it would attempt to overcome resistance and to secure the road.

7. In their advance planning for their introduction of new access procedures, the Soviets would have considered a reaction on this scale as possible but unlikely; if they had judged it to be probable, they almost certainly would have avoided provoking it. They probably would not conclude from this reaction alone that the Allies had taken a firm decision to press all the way to general war if necessary; yet they could not be certain that they would not miscalculate further Western steps as they had the first. They would wish to minimize the risks of general war, and they would be gravely concerned lest large-scale fighting within East Germany create

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an uncontrollable situation. Yet they would regard their prestige as being heavily engaged, and they would greatly fear that failure to act would undermine Communist authority in East Germany, and perhaps lead to popular uprisings.

8. We believe it virtually certain that the Soviets would not permit Western forces to seize control of the entire autobahn and march unopposed into Berlin. They would probably try first to block the Western forces at or near the zonal border, using forces moved into position as soon as Allied preparations were noted. If this failed, and a substantial penetration occurred, the Soviets would seek at a minimum to halt and neutralize the Western forces and, probably, to force their withdrawal. In general, we think that they would undertake the minimum response necessary to accomplish their objective, recognizing that, the larger the scale of any military engagement, the greater would be the risks of a further expansion of the conflict.

9. In the first stage, it is probable that the USSR would use East German troops, in order to be consistent with the claim of GDR sovereignty and to postpone a Soviet-Western confrontation until it became clear how far the West intended to go in its initial local action. We believe, however, that the USSR would commit its own troops whenever it became clear

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that East German forces could not deal with the situation. The Soviets would not use other Satellite troops.

10. Throughout, the Soviets would seek to keep the fighting limited and to bring it quickly to an end, in a manner which would demonstrate that a Western resort to force was bound to fail. At the same time, they would mount an intense campaign in support of a call for immediate negotiations, calculating that this would redound to their credit, generate pressure on the Allies to desist, and perhaps contribute to an end to hostilities. They would probably refrain from molesting West Berlin; we do not believe, however, that they would immediately offer to restore the former conditions of access. Their political and psychological activities would be employed as a supplement to military action rather than a substitute for it.

As a step subsequent to the above, the commitment of West German troops as reinforcements.<sup>3/</sup>

11. The reinforcement with West German forces would presumably occur only after some fighting had already taken place. Simply because it was a reinforcement, the Soviets would probably give increased weight to the possibility that the West

<sup>3/</sup> We do not here estimate whether or not the Federal Republic would agree to this course of action.

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was prepared to go very far and take very great risks in defense of its position in Berlin. The fact that West German forces were used would probably cause the Soviets also to fear that the conflict might transform itself into a liberation campaign, involving East German Army defections and popular risings. The Soviets would therefore probably regard any failure to defeat such a force quickly as highly dangerous to their position in East Germany in Eastern Europe as a whole.

12. The possibility that the Soviets might decide to seize the initiative with a general nuclear attack on the West would rise with the commitment of West German troops, even though no more than minimal surprise would be possible at this point. However, we regard this as very unlikely. Their most probable response would be an intensification of political pressure and a major military effort, although still nonnuclear, to expel the Western forces. We believe that they would still wish to confine the encounter to East German territory, because of a fear that to retaliate against or invade West Germany could lead rapidly to general war.

COURSE B: A substantial effort to maintain  
air access -- defined as efforts to continue

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flights unilaterally following attempts by the USSR and the GDR to alter existing flight procedures. If there were interference which endangered the safety of aircraft in the corridors, Allied combat aircraft would come to their assistance.

13. This contingency is most likely to arise by way of Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center and Allied refusal to accept an East German substitute. In taking such a step, the USSR would probably have concluded in advance that the West would react initially by continuing flights to Berlin without the usual guarantees of safety, and accordingly would have planned its next step.

14. The Soviets and East Germans would probably employ means of interference short of firing upon aircraft. If the Allies felt obliged to employ combat aircraft as escorts, we do not believe that the Soviets would even then actually fire upon planes which remained within the corridor, although the likelihood of their doing so would increase. Actual firing would cause them to appear before the world as the initiator of hostilities, and they would probably prefer to limit themselves to electronic countermeasures (ECM), "buzzing," and

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other nonviolent actions. If Allied aircraft opened fire, however, Bloc aircraft would probably return it.

15. The Soviet and East German capability for electronic countermeasures in the Berlin area and the air corridors is sufficient to limit Western air traffic to that which could be maintained under visual flight conditions. Such limitations would not be serious if ground access to West Berlin remained open for West German civilians and their goods. Even if a complete blockade of ground access were established, ECM alone would not succeed in preventing the movement of essential supplies to the city by visual flights, although Berlin's industry would be seriously disrupted. The use of ECM together with other forms of harassment short of actual combat would reduce the volume of flight traffic still further, but the effectiveness of these tactics would depend on the degree of deprivation which West Berlin was willing to bear; stockpiles in the city are sufficient for a considerable period of time.<sup>4/</sup>

COURSE C: Other pressures and reprisals --  
e.g., tripartite interference with Soviet  
and East German merchant shipping, Allied and

<sup>4/</sup> These stockpiles include basic foods sufficient for at least a year, a 12-month supply of hard coal, and a six-month supply of brown coal briquettes, dry milk, dehydrated vegetables, clothing, and medical supplies. West Berlin has its own utilities, with the exception of sewage disposal.

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West German economic sanctions, the rupture  
of diplomatic relations, and other retaliatory  
measures.

16. We believe that such measures are among those that the Soviet leaders would expect in the way of Allied reactions to altered conditions of access to Berlin. Taken by themselves, they would probably have the effect of strengthening the Soviet judgment that the Allies were unwilling to risk the direct use of force against any but the most clear-cut challenge to their position in Berlin.

17. The Soviet response would probably be limited largely to propaganda, to diplomatic and legal counteraction, and, in the case of naval controls, to reprisals in the form of detention of Allied shipping in areas of Communist control and closing of certain waters to Allied vessels. The USSR could circumvent controls by recourse to ships of other flags and by overland shipments if it felt obliged to do so. It might use armed escorts for its shipping where feasible.

18. Allied naval measures and economic sanctions, even in combination, would have little effect on the Soviet economy. The repercussions for East Germany of a cutoff of all Western

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trade would be substantial, although current attempts to reorient GDR trade away from the West will reduce this vulnerability in the future. East Germany would probably respond with harassments of West German traffic to Berlin, but we doubt that the Communists would wish in the first instance to cut off this traffic entirely, preferring not to raise this additional issue at a time when Allied access was in contention. The USSR would probably calculate that the Allies could not maintain most of these policies effectively over a long period of time. We do not think, therefore, that these courses of action, undertaken in the absence of other moves, would have a significant effect on the Soviet position regarding access. Taken in conjunction with other measures, they would probably reinforce in the Soviet mind the possibility that the Allies were prepared to run substantial risks over Berlin.

COURSE D: Large-scale preparations for general war -- defined as widespread deployments, preparations to bring the US to full military and civilian readiness, and corresponding official acts such as declaration of a state of emergency, appropriate Congressional resolutions, and consultations within various alliances.

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19. While US preparations for general war of this scope and nature probably would not convince the USSR that the US had firmly decided to proceed if necessary to that extreme, the Soviet leaders would certainly view the chances of general war as dangerously increased, particularly if the principal NATO Allies of the US appeared to be in agreement. We think that, under these conditions, the Soviets would probably seek ways to reopen negotiations in order to ease the crisis, hoping that they could in the subsequent bargaining achieve some change in the status of Berlin favorable to them. It should be observed, however, that the danger of miscalculation in this situation would be great. If the NATO Allies clearly were not in step with the US, we still think it likely that the Soviets would seek to open negotiations; in this case, however, they would probably expect the divided policies of their opponents to assure a favorable diplomatic outcome for themselves.

Reactions to the postulated courses in other areas

20. In the NATO countries, much would depend on the manner in which the issue was posed. In general, the postulated courses of action would excite widespread public alarm and dismay in varying degree as they appeared to threaten general war. To be sure, according to the problem as postulated in this estimate, the British and French Governments

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would have agreed in advance to the stated courses of action, and presumably they would have done something to prepare their peoples for the crisis. It goes without saying that the other members of NATO would expect to have been consulted. Yet we believe there would be little public support for the more drastic allied responses unless the earlier Soviet (or East German) action could be convincingly portrayed as an attempt to seize control of Berlin rather than merely to introduce changes in access procedures. Even in this case, many Europeans would balk at taking such risks for the sake of Berlin, and public support from some NATO governments would be reluctantly given.

21. In East Germany, there would be a possibility, particularly in connection with Course A, of popular risings, but we think it more likely that the population would not expose itself to retaliation so long as the outcome remained uncertain. The longer the fighting under Course A, the higher the chances of scattered antiregime demonstrations and violence. Both hopes and fears would be aroused among the populations of East Europe, but these would have no great political effect in the short term.

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22. In most non-European countries, attention would be focused primarily upon the possibility of general war, and this consideration would probably override views about the rights and wrongs of the access issue. Few countries would cooperate in multilateral indirect reprisals of the type envisaged in Course C. It is almost certain that the situation would be brought to the UN, and that many countries would exert pressure on both the US and the USSR to resume negotiations and ease the crisis.

General Considerations

23. It is important to emphasize again that the courses of action postulated in this estimate have been considered mainly in isolation from each other and from other events, and that such a treatment is to a large degree artificial. Just as the initial Soviet action would have been based on an assessment of numerous indications, tangible and intangible, of probable Western responses, so the Soviet reaction in the second round would be based on a similarly broad assessment of the West's next step, drawn from the entire range of political and military activity. Central to this assessment would be the Soviet leaders' impression of the will and determination of Western leadership to persist in a firm course,

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and the ability of that leadership to carry the Western peoples with them. The Soviet judgment would be taken in a context of severe international crisis, with many countries making their weight felt in diplomatic exchanges and, probably, in UN debate. As tensions rose, worldwide demands that the parties to the dispute take no precipitate action and return to negotiation would grow in intensity, to such a degree that both sides might feel obliged to weigh seriously the reactions of world opinion to any further steps.

24. The Soviets would probably consider that the consequences of forcing their policy on Berlin under conditions of intense and possibly prolonged crisis could be damaging to the further perspectives of their policy. They might hesitate to persist in their demands if they believed that the result would be greatly heightened tensions and an atmosphere of such hostility that nothing could be negotiated for a long time to come. On the other hand, they would also consider the damage to Western confidence and unity, and the advantages to their own cause, that would result from a clear victory on Berlin.

25. We are confident that the Soviet leaders do not intend to wage general war in order to change the status of Berlin. At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders have

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not yet been persuaded that the US will go to general war in order to prevent a change in that status. If they were to become convinced that the US will actually do so, we believe that they would back off and seek negotiations, providing the US had left them this recourse. We doubt that they can be fully convinced that the US will do so, but even if they are not fully convinced, we believe that one or more of the postulated courses of action, taken together with supporting political and diplomatic action by the US and its allies, might make the Soviet leaders uncertain of ultimate US intentions, and persuade them that the West was willing to take actions of such high risk that the situation would soon get out of control. Thus the Soviets might be prepared to believe that the crisis could eventuate in general war even though neither side originally had intended to go that far. They certainly desire to avoid such uncontrollable situations, but it is impossible to estimate at just what point they might be willing to modify their Berlin policy in order to retrieve the situation, or when they would consider that the stakes were already so high that they could not afford to compromise.

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(23)

Meeting No. 23

1. Subject arrived at 1940 house on 23rd July, 1961

2. Subject opens package and shows KLAUTA camera.  
 a) They have 4 types of camera: one KLAUTA, one cine-camera, a new German one, and two ordinary Soviet ones. I got this from PAVLOV, yesterday, for my trip to STAMPAER. This camera is now loaded with a British made film (ILFORD). I brought this for you to take the number etc. in case operational use is made with this camera in the future - and secondly I'd like to have the photographic instructor to tell me how best to use it. I have an exposure and time chart here which they gave me, and I would like it checked.  
 G: That is fine, we will do all this before you go on your trip.

3. G: I have one very interesting thing to tell you. I was even thinking of calling you yesterday. SHAPOVALOV came up to me yesterday after I had had my conversation with PAVLOV, and said "Oleg Vladimirovich I would like your advice, you are my former boss, I've some trouble concerning my work". Before that I had read a telegram from SHEROV enquiring about his family, a reply has been sent mentioning the £20 loan and the shopping expedition. PAVLOV has already sent off the telegram about ANITA, here is the text: "During the British Industries Fair in MOSCOW, such and such a firm exhibited two prototypes of a portable computer ANITA. At the present time the firm has signed a great number of contracts with certain capitalist countries for the supply of this machine (mentioning October). During the fair our specialists in MOSCOW considered the advisability of acquiring the ANITA computer. The English firm had then replied that they can only sell it on the basis of one thousand at a time. The English specialist who maintains scientific - technical relations with the Committee has promised (Subject's name) to obtain an ANITA machine against cash down and subsequently pass it on to us. The price of the machine is \$400. Please reply urgently whether it is advisable to give this sum, via (Subject's name) to the British specialist or there may be the possibility of repayment after delivery of the machine. Let us have your instructions."

4. G: Did you mention the dates of the exhibition? S: No, I gave PAVLOV all the other details exactly. He asked me to thank SHEROV and to arrange a meeting with WIGOR at the Embassy at 10 o'clock on Monday. VORONIN came in and told PAVLOV and me that he is leaving LONDON by air on either Saturday or Sunday.

5. S: Then I went with SHAPOVALOV to his office. I have been in five rooms already which are involved with intelligence work, I will draw it up for you later. SHAPOVALOV's trouble consists in the fact that the "Centre" had ordered him to drop his Indian contact as he was suspected of being an "agent-provocateur". The Indian in question is a journalist, a young man, representative of an insignificant Indian paper. I reported this to you in the Spring. His name begins with L, and on the 23rd July he is supposed to have gone on a trip to PHU, as a member of a delegation of journalists

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**VII-5:** *(Continued)*

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21. Subject then refers to Van VLIET and how displeased he was by his transfer from MOSCOW. G. Explains that van VLIET was removed because of woman trouble. S. The people in the (Soviet) Ministry of Foreign Trade, who have spoken to me about him, were of a very low opinion as to his abilities. They thought him a fool. Subject then repeats that SMITH, the Ambassador, treats him (Subject) in a very friendly manner.

22. G: Now, about MERRIMAN, I am to ring him? H: Yes.  
S: All right. And think about MERRINE. On the 31st I will take WINE to meet PAULOV. Prior to my departure I need receipts, hotel bills, which WINE should obtain for me.

23. Subject mentions the Zenith radio, and George tells him to be silent and look. The radio is shown him. George explains in detail that this radio is being given him to show him we are sympathetic to his wishes as good friends. The gift is from the heart against our better judgement and should show him that money is no problem but security is. Therefore, the tape recorder (personal use) is out since he would be suspect having it and risk a disaster by trying to record VARENTEV if the latter should visit subject.

24. Furthermore Subject should abide by our advice and decisions re future requests of a security risk nature and minimize his acquisitive desires. Subject was visibly touched and thanked us profusely.

25. G: However I'll have WINE take it in, rather than taking it now. (The set was removed from its packing box and Subject was shown its components, operation etc. Its unpacked size permits it to be carried in a normal suitcase easily. Subject reassured us that he can easily legend his having obtained the set in the Comedison store. He explained how it is registered, how easily it can go through customs, etc. Since WINE had requested to postpone his trip to the USSR till 16th August due to his son's sudden apendectomy, the schedule was reviewed and to permit Subject's leave Janet and husband's leave and WINE's arrival to fit in, the 23rd August was decided upon.)

Article  
Plan

26. G: Regarding the military article you wanted our help to write; it seems that since you are an artillery officer and have been given access to the FTUE data by VARENTEV, and other artillery studies; you should look over the material in the GSI apartment to see what manuals or data there is on the same subject - anti-tank weapons, are from Anglo-American Military material - and give us the bibliography.  
S: I'll consider this and I will get a list of subjects and magazines dealing with Anglo-American forces which KUBERIKIN's people hold in the GSI Information Directorate. I will even expand the subject matter, maybe an infantry topic would be O.K. I will also try and send photocopies of my other papers and articles which I can get - through WINE.

27. G: Just send us a bibliography. S: I will send you a complete list of what we have on your forces. Then if you can send me the material back I'll work it over properly.

Photo  
Specimen

28. G: Now to reassure you that your information is definitely reaching our leaders - here is a report on President KENNEDY's speech. I won't read it to you but I can point out to you that in a number of statements, exactly those thoughts which you suggested were mentioned. (Subject was delighted).

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29. I reported to you last Spring about the situation at the time of KHRUSHCHEV's coming to power. When he kicked out the opposition - MALENKOV - etc. There was even three days when he was not in power. KHRUSHCHEV is adopting the same technique with the Army he had previously with the Party officials. During his "reign" he has personally promoted approximately 1500 officers to Generals out of a total of 4 - 5000, and also promoted a number of old Generals to higher ranks, up to the rank of Marshal, and even Chief Marshal. He relies on their support. But both in the Presidium and in the Central Committee there are still a number of people who supported MALENKOV, MOLOTOV, BULGANIN, etc. FERVUKHIN is one of them. There are also unconfirmed rumors that KHRUSHCHEV fights occasionally with MIKHAIL. MIKHAIL is in opposition with regard to some of KHRUSHCHEV's expeditions, arrangements etc. KHRUSHCHEV is not popular with the masses. They do not care for his jokes, comments, etc. They blame him for the miserable life they have to live. We know he is a political adventurer.

30. Among the leaders (rulers) there exists a secret opposition, which remains secret because the majority are still KHRUSHCHEV's proteges and the others don't want to lose their jobs. But there could be a distribution of forces and a split as a result of the BERLIN question. All of them who are aware of the weak points, with regard to the economic and military situations, who will say "It is too early to go to war. We've got to wait. What's the point of heating up the situation because of a BERLIN which has existed for the last 16 years." Should this occur, it is possible the KHRUSHCHEV will carry the day and win once again, on the other hand the reverse might happen. He has to take this into consideration. They could either remove KHRUSHCHEV, saying he was ill or else he might resign - as MALENKOV did, or they could say "You go on being the boss, but let's treat on the BERLIN question, let's think something up." Let's say outright that we are defenders of the peace, the Anglo-Americans have taken the extreme view of our declaration and are preparing for war, we don't want war, there's no hurry, we'll settle the BERLIN question someday. There are lots of diplomatic words that can be found in order to meet the situation and to fool the people and life again.

31. The 22nd Congress will decide what action is to be taken. It doesn't appear on the Agenda, but as I have told you before whenever there is one of these big gatherings they have secret sessions, the plenum, the presidium, and I am positive that this matter will be discussed, it might even be discussed before the official opening of the Congress. So we must keep in mind these three possibilities. (Subject continues on this theme for some time, repeating roughly what he has already said.) - Namely:

- 1) KHRUSHCHEV may crush all opposition and proceed to sign that German peace treaty, inviting local hostilities and risking general war.
- 2) KHRUSHCHEV may be forced to compromise and delay signing peace treaty in view of Western opposition and propagandize this move as his desire for peace - still postponing possible action re East Germany and Berlin to a further date.
- 3) KHRUSHCHEV may be deposed.

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



Approved for Release  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

WEEKLY REVIEW

BERLIN

In an effort to halt the refugee flow, which reached near-panic proportions last week, the East German regime--purportedly at the behest of the Warsaw Pact countries--moved swiftly and effectively in the early morning hours of 13 August to seal off West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany. At the same time it announced a series of decrees spelling out its actions.

The New Decrees

All East Germans and East Berliners who wish to go to West Berlin will have to secure special permits from their local police. A veiled warning was issued to East Germans to stay out of East Berlin unless on official business. The number of crossing points on the sector border between East and West Berlin was reduced from 87 to 13. East German army, police, and security forces were brought in to control movement over the sector and zonal borders surrounding West Berlin. It also was decreed that East Berlin and East German "border crossers" who have been working in West Berlin must no longer work there.

The East German Ministry of Transport took steps to cut off elevated railroad (S-Bahn) service between West Berlin and both the Soviet sector and the East Zone. The S-Bahn, operated by the East German regime, has been the main transportation artery in the city and surrounding suburban areas. The S-Bahn service will be continued within West Berlin and, separately, in East Berlin and the zone. Similarly, the subway (U-Bahn)--under Western control except for one line--is permitted to make only one stop on the two lines which run through East Berlin.

On 15 August, the East German Ministry of Interior issued a regulation requiring West Berliners to secure special per-

mits for their cars or motorcycles to enter East Berlin. Thus, for the first time West Berliners are forced to secure permits to enter the Soviet sector. This decree, like those of 13 August, violates the post-war quadripartite agreements providing for Four-Power occupation of all of Berlin as well as the Four-Power Paris agreement of 20 June 1949 which ended the blockade of Berlin.

The East Germans also reduced the number of East - West Berlin sector control points where West Germans may secure passes to visit East Berlin. This move underlines the regime's claim to the right to control West German travel into East Berlin, set forth initially in a decree of 8 September 1960--also in violation of the Four-Power status of Berlin. This decree was one of the major reasons leading Bonn to abrogate the international trade agreement last September. Bonn rescinded this action only after the East Germans in December agreed, among other concessions, not to give effective enforcement to the 8 September decree.

The regime has announced also that it will be illegal for East Germans to accept identification papers from West Berlin or West Germany. Bonn hitherto had granted such identification to East Germans, on grounds of common German citizenship.

Refugee Flights

Figures on the official registrations of East German refugees at the Marienfelde Refugee Reception Center for 12 through 15 August total 10,712. The large majority of those escaped before the border closed on 13 August. No reliable count is yet available of those refugees who have since circumvented the new controls. Of the four-day total, 1,636 were border crossers; 994 of these came from East Berlin.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

sanctions might be imposed against the Communist bloc if the Berlin issue could not be settled.

There has, however, been interference with communications linking East Germany, West Berlin, and West Germany. The US Mission in Berlin reported on



Traffic and Communications

While traffic--either Allied or West German--between West Berlin and West Germany has not yet been affected, the regime has threatened to interfere with West German freight shipments if Bonn resorts to economic countermeasures. Chancellor Adenauer in a speech on 14 August warned that trade

15 August that telephone service between East and West Germany was still interrupted, although that between West Berlin and West Germany was functioning normally. Telex service between East and West Berlin has been cut. These moves probably reflect the regime's attempt to deprive its own population of means to communicate with the West.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Travel of East Germans to the West appears to have been drastically cut. The press reports that East Germans are being ordered off trains at frontier points between East and West Germany. The Swedish travel bureau says that East Germans are no longer to be allowed to organize travel groups via ferry to Sweden.

Military Moves

Elements of two--and possibly three--Soviet divisions stationed outside Berlin were at the outset deployed in small tank and infantry groups in a circle two to three miles from the city's Outer Ring. These elements had evidently withdrawn or moved into assembly areas by the afternoon of 16 August. The East German army and police units which moved into the Berlin area this past week end are apparently still there.

Popular Reaction

The East German population, cowed by the show of Soviet - East German force, is generally taking a cautious line in commenting on developments and evidently is closely watching for reactions by the Western powers.




Soviet Position

The Soviet decision, apparently taken at the Warsaw Pact conference on 3-5 August, to authorize the controls to halt the refugee flow underscores the dilemma confronting Khrushchev. Since his talks with President Kennedy in Vienna in early June, the Soviet premier has sought to impress the West with his determination to bring the Berlin situation to a head.

before the end of the year. As part of his campaign to force the West into early negotiations on Soviet terms, he had gone to some lengths to create the impression that no Western moves could deflect the bloc from carrying through with its announced intentions. This more aggressive tone, however, was largely instrumental in precipitating the mass flight of East Germans which was an acute embarrassment for Soviet police.

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## TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY\*

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**VII-6:** *(Continued)*

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

indicated that the bloc foreign ministers will meet in "late fall" to consider the "results of the preparatory work" on a treaty, while Ulbricht indicated that drafting of a treaty was now in progress.

Khrushchev's speech of 11 August, however, is evidence that the USSR is still holding the door open to negotiations. While giving equal weight to threats against NATO Allies and to appeals for negotiations, Khrushchev sought to display some flexibility on the possibilities for a negotiated settlement. He reaffirmed that the USSR would offer "reliable guarantees" for a free-city status and indicated that there could be several "variations" on the terms of such guarantees. He also claimed that the question of West Berlin was "in itself" not so difficult to solve, provided the issue was not turned into a "trial of strength."

The announcement on 10 August that Marshal Ivan Konev had been appointed commander of Soviet forces in East Germany was probably related to the decision to seal the Berlin sector boundaries and to the general Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the West. Konev's appointment places a highly trusted and close associate of Khrushchev in a key position during a period of greatly increased tensions in Berlin. The advance notice that Konev was in command was probably calculated to impress the East German populace with the extent of Soviet support for the regime and Soviet willingness to use its forces to suppress any popular opposition.

The naming of Konev also served to underscore the seriousness of the measures recently announced by Khrushchev to "make the defensive might of the So-

viet Union even stronger and more dependable." The selection of Konev, commander of the Warsaw Pact for five years and leader of the forces which captured Berlin, is also calculated to sharpen the repeated warning that the bloc will rebuff any resort to force by the West following a separate peace treaty. Khrushchev probably feels that the appointment of a man of Konev's prestige and experience will strengthen his efforts to impress the West with his determination to conclude a separate treaty in the absence of a negotiated settlement.

The 13 August letter of the Soviet commandant in Berlin, rejecting a 3 August Western protest against restrictions at that time on border crossers, previews the general diplomatic line the USSR can be expected to follow in connection with Western protests against the current control measures. The Soviet letter reaffirms Moscow's contention that East Germany has sole legal jurisdiction over East Berlin. Underlining the "exclusive competence" of the Ulbricht regime in East Berlin, it charges the West with using the "occupation regime in West Berlin for intolerable provocations and undermining activities" against East Germany and the bloc.

Reaction in West Germany and West Berlin



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West German and West Berlin leaders have urged all Germans to remain calm and patient and avoid "emotional behavior" which would only worsen the situation in East Germany. Defense Minister Strauss, at a campaign rally on 14 August, warned that any explosive reaction by West Germans to East German moves would lead to developments "impossible to control," adding, "If shooting starts, no one knows with what kinds of weapons it will end." Strauss criticized the overeagerness of West German businessmen for trade with the bloc and said that the East German Leipzig Fair, scheduled for 3-10 September, was no place for West German participation.

West Berliners, meanwhile, are becoming increasingly restive over the lack of prompt Western countermeasures.

West Berlin crowds on 15 August criticized Brandt for making "high-sounding statements but failing to take concrete measures." To reduce the chances of incidents, West Berlin police are being kept on "maximum alert" and all demonstrations near the sector borders are forbidden.

At the large demonstration addressed by Mayor Brandt on 16 August, West Berliners waved banners saying "Better dead than Red"; "No demand countermeasures"; "90 hours without doing anything"; and "Betrayed by the

the West?" Berlin officials scheduled the rally as a means of allowing the restive populace to "let off steam" and restore confidence. Some instances of panic buying have been reported, and city officials have been queried by anxious individuals as to whether they should go ahead with vacation plans or whether they should make preparations for leaving the city. Political leaders are fearful that a "crisis of confidence" may develop as a result of unfulfilled expectations of Western countermeasures.

West Berlin officials maintain that no "serious" trouble is expected from the loss of the 50,000 East Germans who had jobs in West Berlin. Most firms expect only a temporary inconvenience since they were careful to limit the proportion of border crossers working in any one part of their operations. The greatest hardship will be experienced by small firms where the lack of one or two skilled workers can cause serious trouble or where most of the workers were border crossers.

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SNIE 11-10-61  
24 August 1961

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SPECIAL  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE  
NUMBER 11-10-61

SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

Submitted by the  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
This document is a special intelligence estimate prepared by the  
Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the intelligence organizations of the Department of  
State, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
On 24 August 1961, concurring were: The Director of Intelligence Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the latter being outside of their jurisdiction.

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## SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis over the next few months, with particular reference to the effect on these tactics of possible developments within East Germany.

### THE ESTIMATE

1. With the action of 13 August, the Communists have taken a long step toward their objectives in Berlin and have created a new political situation there. The border controls instituted on that date have met East Germany's most pressing need by reducing the refugee flow to tolerable proportions. At the same time, the division of Berlin into two separate cities has been made virtually complete, with the eastern portion all but incorporated into the GDR. Thus the Soviets, induced by the rising tide of refugees, have taken unilateral action to achieve results which they had intended to accomplish at a later date, and by different means.

2. The refugee question, however, was only one aspect of the larger problem of stabilizing the GDR, and the closing of the Berlin escape route may worsen other aspects if it leads to a further buildup of tensions within East Germany. Even apart from this, the stemming of the refugee flow will not change the USSR's view of the necessity to bolster the GDR's claims to sovereignty with a peace treaty and eventually to eject Western influence from Berlin altogether. We do not believe that the USSR has given up its intention to press for a peace treaty and a "free city." The question is whether the Soviet leaders will accelerate their movement towards these objectives, or will moderate their pace after their considerable achievements of 13 August.

3. The action in Berlin has initiated a momentum which the Soviets may wish to sustain. A wide variety of further unilateral measures is available to them. The termination of military liaison missions would be a relatively low-keyed act which might appear to the Soviets as a means of keeping events moving in their favor.<sup>1</sup> Another option would be to deny Allied rights to enter East Berlin, thereby carrying to its conclusion the destruction of the four-power status of that part of the city. More drastically, the East Germans might disrupt or harass civil traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic; most dangerous of all, interference with Allied access might begin. Politically, the USSR might choose to accelerate the timing of a peace conference and a separate treaty with the GDR.

4. Another factor which could importantly affect the USSR's timing and tactics is the increasing involvement of Soviet prestige. Khrushchev in recent weeks has reacted to the stiffening US attitude by increasing his commitment to early action. He now asserts that the issue transcends the problems of Germany and Berlin, important as these re-

<sup>1</sup>Under the occupation, the US, French, and British forces in West Germany presently have military missions accredited to the Soviet Commander in East Germany, who in turn has missions to the three Allied Commanders.

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main, and that the West's refusal to conclude a peace treaty represents an attempt to achieve a "strategic breakthrough" against the Bloc. In claiming a challenge to Soviet power and prestige, he wishes to convey to his opponents that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to draw back from crisis situations in which reason and prudence would appear to dictate restraint. He might decide to take new steps on Berlin which would strengthen the image of inflexible resolve.

5. In our recent estimates of the USSR's policy toward Germany and Berlin, we have regularly attributed to the Soviet leaders a confidence that they can move gradually toward their eventual objectives without incurring unacceptable risks. We have pointed to their belief that the West could probably be induced to make negotiated concessions. And we have further estimated that, if these Soviet expectations are not borne out, the USSR will move unilaterally, but still intending to proceed in such a way as to avoid at any stage unduly high risks of war.<sup>2</sup>

6. We believe that Soviet actions in the recent phase of the Berlin crisis do not indicate that the USSR has departed from this general approach and method. Thus we conclude that the Soviets' present intention probably is not to take further drastic action immediately, though they may undertake measures of limited scope. For example, they will probably further restrict German civil and Allied access to East Berlin, and they may embark upon a program of gradual harassments of German civil traffic to West Berlin. But rather than pose a major challenge to West Berlin itself and the Allied position there, we believe that their present preference is to let the effects of the border closure sink in and see whether the Western Powers have

<sup>2</sup>Our principal estimates on Soviet policy with respect to Berlin and Germany are NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," dated 1 December 1960, paragraphs 161-164, TOP SECRET; NIE 11-7-61, "Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany," dated 25 April 1961, SECRET; and SNIE 2-2-61, "Soviet and Other Reactions to Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to Berlin," dated 11 July 1961, TOP SECRET, Limited Distribution.

become more inclined to accept Soviet terms of negotiations.

7. In the absence of fairly definite proposals by the West, we think it unlikely that Khrushchev will take the initiative in formally proposing a date and other specifics for East-West negotiations. He clearly wishes to appear as the champion of negotiations, and he may throw out hints, in an effort to encourage a Western proposal, that the USSR could be persuaded to reduce its demands if a conference were arranged. If presented with a Western invitation, he would respond favorably but would undoubtedly attempt to define the task of the conference in a fashion which served Soviet interests. If the negotiations were in train toward the end of the year, he would probably postpone his deadline for a treaty. If negotiations do not materialize, we believe that the next Soviet step will be to issue invitations to their own peace conference, probably accompanied by a revised draft of a treaty applicable to both German states and providing for the declaration of a "free city" status for West Berlin. We think under these circumstances that the chances are still considerably better than even that the treaty would not be signed before the Party Congress which convenes on 17 October.

#### Effect of Developments in East Germany

8. Soviet tactics will be affected by a large number of factors, including the posture adopted by the West, the movement of opinion in the important uncommitted countries, and domestic developments in East Germany. We have recently examined the possibility that serious unrest might arise in East Germany and have concluded that, under most circumstances, a major eruption is unlikely;<sup>3</sup> here we consider how popular disturbances or an uprising might affect Soviet tactics.

9. The Soviet leaders evidently are confident of their capability for keeping discontent in check and repressing any outbreaks which might occur. If they came to feel that the chances of a general rising were becoming

<sup>3</sup>SNIE 12-4-61, "Stability of East Germany in a Berlin Crisis," dated 15 August 1961, SECRET.

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substantial, their main domestic efforts would probably be in the direction of menace and intimidation. They would alert and deploy their own forces in East Germany, as well as those of the GDR, and the public would be warned of the regime's determination to react with speed and vigor to hostile manifestations. Additionally, they would probably make available additional supplies of consumer goods in order to relieve economic shortages.

10. Popular dissatisfaction with internal political and economic conditions would be the basic cause of mass unrest. However, the Communist efforts to consolidate the GDR as a separate German state by isolating it from further contact with the West, combined with the international tension generated by Communist pressures against West Berlin, are adding to popular unrest. Thus, there is a relationship between the degree of unrest in East Germany and Moscow's pursuit of its policies aimed at neutralizing West Berlin and fixing the division of Germany, particularly since the 13 August action has deprived the East German regime of a safety valve.

11. Even so, we see little chance that the USSR, if it believed that an East German rising was likely, would respond by altering its

principal aims or policies with respect to Berlin. While it is possible that the Soviets might temporarily modify their tactics or extend their timing to reduce the likelihood of a serious German uprising, we think it unlikely that such a Soviet response would be either very significant or lasting. Moreover, we believe that it would be next to impossible to convince the USSR, the GDR, or the East German people that the West intended or had the capability to support widespread anti-regime activities.

12. We believe that the Communists will act speedily and firmly in meeting evidences of public disorder, if these actually develop, in East Germany in the months ahead. If an uprising should occur, they would regard themselves as having no other choice than to put it down, despite the cost to their position and the danger of Western involvement. In the wake of such a repression, the Soviets might accelerate their moves toward a separate peace treaty, believing that it was unprofitable to spend further time in cultivating world opinion or waiting for East-West talks, and that an early treaty would start the process of rebuilding East German sovereignty and authority.

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## WEEKLY REVIEW

## BERLIN

Border Controls

The Ulbricht regime has made further moves to strengthen the security of the sector and zonal borders surrounding West Berlin and to reduce and more efficiently control movement between East and West Berlin. New measures over the past week involve controls that might be encountered at a recognized international frontier--including replacement of the barbed-wire barricades along the East-West Berlin sector border on 13 August with concrete barriers, the strengthening of barbed-wire fences along the zonal border adjoining West Berlin on three sides, and various types of personal checks on those desiring to cross the border.

The regime has gradually reduced the number of crossing points on the sector border from the 13 announced on 12 August to 7. The Ministry of Interior on 22 August issued a series of decrees, to go into effect the following day at 0001 hours, regulating access to East Berlin by West Germans, West Berliners, and Western military and diplomatic personnel. The announcement stated that the new regulations--as was the case in the 12 August decrees closing the sector borders--would remain in effect "until the conclusion of a peace treaty."

Foreign nationals (other than West Germans), members of the diplomatic corps, and personnel of the Western occupation forces now may cross the sector border at only one point, Friedrichstrasse. West Germans will be permitted to cross at

only two points, Borholmerstrasse and Heinrich Heine Strasse. West Berliners are restricted to four crossing points--Chaussee-strasse, Oberbaumbruecke, Sonnen Allee, and Invalidenstrasse--and, for the first time, they will be required to obtain an East German permit, at the cost of one West German mark, to enter East Berlin.

There has been some actual interference with travel over the sector border by Western Allied personnel. On 22 August, prior to the imposition of the new restrictions, East German police detained a US military patrol--the first incident of this character involving US personnel since the promulgation of the 12 August decrees, although instances of interference have occurred in East Berlin in the past. A British patrol which strayed over the zonal border was detained for three hours last week.

In a test of the new restrictions, a US military patrol crossed into East Berlin on 23 August at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint. When it sought to return via a street not designated as a checkpoint, it was turned back. It then proceeded to Eisenstrasse, where it found the road blocked. East German guards refused a request to talk with a Soviet officer, but did not prevent the patrol from leaving the area. Finally, the patrol returned to West Berlin via Sonnen Allee.

In and around Berlin, security and police forces are still in evidence. Controls at the sector and zonal border nevertheless appear to have been

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
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exercised somewhat sporadically. Although the number of refugees has been drastically reduced since 13 August, a significant number of East Germans and East Berliners are still escaping. On 22 August, 629 refugees registered at the Marienfelde reception center, of whom 168 had arrived since 13 August; the respective figures for 21 August were 1,202 and 238. No fewer than 13,837 persons regis-

Walter Ulbricht displayed great self-assurance at having successfully completed the difficult problem of sealing off West Berlin. There was, however, a note of concern about the reactions of the East German population. "For some time," he said, "there will continue to exist in the GDR capital and its environs people who have allowed themselves to be influenced and de-

praved by West Berlin." Ul-



tered between 13 and 22 August, of whom more than 2,000 claimed to have fled after the clamp-down.

#### Popular Attitudes

In a television broadcast on 18 August, East German leader


bright is due to make another speech on 25 August.

The regime took extreme precautions to prevent any manifestations of public enthusiasm in connection with the move of the US battle group to Berlin on 20 August. People's Police


were posted in pairs at frequent intervals along the Autobahn.

Party functionaries are organizing a drive to dismantle radio and TV antennae required only to turn in foreign broadcasts. In Leipzig, radio repairmen reportedly have "pledged themselves" not to build or install such aerials, and party propagandists are to visit the homes of those people who persist in listening to Western broadcasts.


The regime also has cracked down on Evangelical Church leaders in East Germany who, on 17 August, signed a telegram protesting the 13 August restrictions. East Berlin Mayor Fritz Ebert called Kurt Scharf, chairman of the church's All-German Synod, on 18 August to rebuke him for signing the telegram. Other East German churchmen have also been lectured by local authorities in an effort to make them withdraw their public position against the regime's ban on free travel.




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TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY



WEST BERLIN REFUGEE TOTALS  
COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS



DAILY TOTALS SINCE 29 JULY 1961



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
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#### Soviet Attitude

In the aftermath of the East German action of 13 August, the USSR appears to be developing a dual line. On the one hand, Moscow has sought to counteract the impact of Vice President Johnson's visit to Berlin and the redeployment of the US battle group by stressing

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the temporary nature of current access controls. Mikoyan in his public remarks in Japan predicted that a separate treaty would be signed by the end of the year and that access to Berlin for any state would then depend on the conclusion of "special agreements" with the East German regime. This general line was also stressed by the Czech Government, which declared its "irrevocable decision" to conclude a treaty before the end of the year. Khrushchev, in a "letter to American readers" on 21 August asserted that the bloc has reached a firm decision not to postpone a peace conference any longer.

The Soviet protest note of 23 August is consistent with the bloc's broad effort to demonstrate the urgency of a peace treaty before the end of the year. The note, apparently intended as a threatening response to Chancellor Adenauer's visit to West Berlin on 22 August, charges the United States with failure to take measures to suppress "provocative activities" of West German officials in West Berlin. The warning of "possible consequences" of continued West German "interference," together with the demand for immediate measures to terminate "illegal and provocative" actions in Berlin, suggests that Moscow may be preparing the groundwork to justify East German harassment of or restrictions on West German traffic to West Berlin and within Berlin.

In an effort to build a case for continued tightening of East German controls in

Berlin, the note accuses the West of "abusing their situation" in Berlin and flagrantly violating four-power agreements by misusing the air corridors to transport "all kinds of revanchists" to Berlin. On 18 August Moscow had replied to the US protest against East German actions by reiterating its position that the East Germans have legal "sovereignty" over East Berlin and that the four-power status of the Soviet sector had long ceased to exist.

At the same time, Soviet leaders have sought to minimize the prospect of an immediate crisis. The Soviet news agency Novosti transmitted the text of Khrushchev's "letter," which restated the Soviet position on Berlin in a relatively moderate manner and is apparently intended as a sign of reassurance that the bloc will not encroach on Western access to West Berlin pending a peace treaty. He also stressed that the possibility remains of negotiating the terms of continued Western access to and presence in Berlin. However, he ruled out any settlement which would reaffirm Western occupation rights in the city and candidly admitted that the question of East German control over Allied access to Berlin is primarily an issue of "political significance" rather than technical procedure.

Mikoyan dismissed the question of access as a "minor point" and repeatedly asserted that the USSR would accept a four-power or UN guarantee for Berlin.

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Reaction in West Berlin and  
West Germany

Vice President Johnson's visit to West Berlin and the movement of additional US troops to the city have succeeded in bolstering the badly shaken morale of the West Berlin populace. According to US officials in Bonn, Chancellor Adenauer's appeal for calm, close association with the Allies, and eventual negotiation with the USSR appears to be closely attuned to the West German public mood. They believe that although Mayor Brandt may have gained increased sympathy and respect from West German voters as a result of the current Berlin crisis, they doubt that this means votes for Brandt's Social Democratic party in the 17 September elections.

West German political figures, despite expressions of wrath and indignation at the sealing off of East Berlin, have generally avoided advocating strong countermeasures and have indicated a feeling of relief that the situation has not gotten out of control. American observers feel that the real impact of the recent events may come only after the elections, when some politician may try to attack the long-standing thesis of Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union that the best chance for ultimate reunification lies in firm ties with the West.

The mission states there have been no significant movements of workers or businessmen from Berlin and no abnormal change in bank deposits or transfer of funds indicating a loss of confidence in the city's economy. Local industries are compensating for the loss of East Berlin workers by transferring personnel and re-employing retired workers.

Although Bonn is not planning any formal ban on West German travel to the East German Leipzig Trade Fair beginning on 3 September, the German Manufacturers' Association has urged a boycott by both exhibitors and visitors. An official of the Munich Chamber of Commerce stated on 21 August that his organization is having a difficult time persuading businessmen to support the boycott. They feel any orders the Germans let go will merely be taken over by British exporters.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## BERLIN

The Communists have continued their threats against the use of the Berlin air corridors by Western commercial carriers, charging them again with transporting West German "militarists" and "revanchists" to West Berlin. While the campaign was timed to coincide with the 1-3 September Homeland Day celebrations in West Berlin by expellees from former German territories in Poland and Czechoslovakia, recent statements lay the groundwork for future interference with commercial air traffic, in an effort to intimidate the Western carriers to suspend their flights or accept East German authority over the corridors. As in the past, the propaganda is directed against the general target of West Germany's ties with West Berlin and forms part of the bloc's effort to further a sense of isolation and helplessness among West Berliners.

The USSR addressed notes on 2 September to the three Western powers in which it recapitulated the position taken in its earlier notes of 23 August that there is no legal basis for the operation of commercial aircraft in the postwar quadripartite agreements relating to Berlin and that the corridors were set up only to supply the needs of the Allied garrisons in Berlin. The notes warned that the Western Allies will be held responsible for any consequences of "provocative activity" carried out by the West German Government in West Berlin.

On 5 September, the Soviet commandant in Berlin, General Solovyev, visited US Commandant Watson to deliver a reply to the Western protest against the sealing off of the Berlin sector border. Solovyev charged that West Berlin "rowdies" had interfered with Soviet officials

on duty in West Berlin, notably Soviet controllers in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). He warned that further such interference might affect BASC operations, implying the Soviets might end their participation. The day before Solovyev met Watson, the East German news agency carried what purported to be the gist of the Soviet commandant's remarks; it was couched in very insulting language and bluntly threatened a walkout from BASC. The US Mission in Berlin reported that Solovyev's remarks followed the broad lines of the East German release but in essentially different tones. Solovyev had no explanation for the premature release of his statement or the insulting character given it.

East German spokesmen have gone out of their way to reaffirm the regime's intention to abide by the terms of the Soviet - East German agreement of 20 September 1955 under which the USSR retained control of Western Allied access to West Berlin. The regime, however, has recently hinted at some qualification of this position.

On 31 August, East Germany delivered two notes, each dated 26 August, to the US Embassy in Prague through the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, charging the US with misuse of the air corridors and of its ground access rights between West Germany and West Berlin. The notes in general restate the charges made by Walter Ulbricht in his 25 August speech in which he insisted that the East German regime has a legal right to control non-military traffic over its territory and will eventually demand control over all traffic to Berlin.

The second note specifically protested the reinforcement of the US Berlin garrison on 20 August and declared that the regime would

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
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ALLIED ACCESS ROUTES TO WEST BERLIN

1. Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn
2. Helmstedt-Berlin railroad
3. Three air corridors

NOTE: Personnel of allied military liaison missions accredited to the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany may cross East Germany on other land routes, but all other allied personnel as well as supplies for allied garrisons in West Berlin may use only the routes listed.

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
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

abide by the terms of the 1955 agreement only as long as these lines of communication are not used for purposes "diametrically opposed" to the postwar agreements. The note charged that the reinforcement of an occupation garrison, "at a time when

crew, presumably summoned by the police, then appeared and took the train through to Berlin. Three days earlier, the US train had been held up when the engineer defected.

On 3 September, however, East German customs police at



it is necessary to abolish occupation regimes," is such a violation.

The East Germans have not yet attempted any serious interference with Western Allied access to West Berlin from West Germany. On 4 September the US military train from Bremerhaven to Berlin was delayed at Brandenburg by East German police, who removed the crew--allegedly for running through a red signal light in the fog. A substitute

the Marienborn checkpoint on the Berlin autobahn attempted, unsuccessfully, to examine the passports of three State Department employees en route to Berlin on official business. On the return trip, the East Germans again attempted to exercise control. This time, a Soviet officer, summoned on the demand of the Americans, waved them on, after commenting that they should have shown their passports to the East Germans.

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East German "Frontiers"

The regime has taken a further step to convert the sector border between East and West Berlin into a state frontier: by establishing a central customs control station at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. A West German press service reports that East Germany has quietly introduced a customs duty on all parcels from West Berlin and West Germany to East Germany. No duty had been levied on such articles in the past.

On 2 and 3 September, East German police built a barbed-wire fence along both sides of the road leading through East Germany from West Berlin to Steinstuecken, an enclave of the US sector of Berlin. While the measures may have been taken simply to cut off refugee escapes through Steinstuecken to the Western sectors, it may be a further step toward the absorption of the enclave into the surrounding East German territory or, alternatively, in East Berlin. West Berlin police have reported that two Steinstuecken residents were arrested for helping refugees reach West Berlin.

In an effort to improve security along the East-West German frontier, the regime has resorted to frequent helicopter surveillance. US military officials report that there has been a marked increase in border violations by Soviet-type helicopters along the frontier. There were seven such violations on 28 August, ten on 29 August, and four between 1 and 3 September.

Pressures on East Germans

The Ulbricht regime, confident of its control over the population, is resorting to

hard-line domestic policies in an effort to silence opposition and increase production. Industrial workers clearly will no longer be handled with the great care previously accorded them. A top planning official--politburo member Bruno Leuschner--recently revealed that the party politburo has sharply criticized the trade union leadership for slackness toward "the class enemy," neglect of the struggle against work slowdowns, and general political and economic weakness. This suggests that harsher provisions for payment and work hours may soon be introduced in an effort to overcome, as far as possible, manpower losses stemming from the refugee flow prior to the sealing off of West Berlin. West German statistics show that more than 184,000 persons fled from East Germany during the first eight months of 1961, compared with just under 200,000 in the whole of 1960.

Leuschner revealed that industrial production during the first six months of 1961 had slumped slightly below the comparable period in 1960, although there was wide variation from sector to sector. Steel and coal apparently came close to plan fulfillment, while the production plan for chemicals was overfulfilled. Shortfalls were chiefly in the key machinery and equipment industries and in construction. Leuschner did not specify what measures are being planned to strengthen controls over labor and management, but he noted that industrial wages paid in the first six months had amounted to 49 percent of the annual plan figure, whereas production had been only 45 percent of plan. The regime probably will put into effect some changes in the work norms and the wage structure; such measures are already authorized by the labor code, which went into effect on 1 July.

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Leuschner also noted that the Economic Council is drawing up specific proposals to eliminate weakness in the union organization. This suggests that Alfred Neumann, who was appointed to head this council in early July, and Karl Mewis, named chief of the State Planning Commission at the same time, may have clashed with long-time trade union chairman Herbert Warnke on the feasibility of speed-up measures to overcome production problems. Widespread shake-ups throughout the union structures are probably in prospect.

Under these pressures, the East German population appears to be tense and uneasy. At the Hennigsdorf locomotive plant north of Berlin, the regime reportedly has arrested at least six engineers after a succession of incidents beginning in early June. Potsdam District party leaders are reported to have been censured for permitting unrest in the plant. A show trial intended to connect worker unrest and alleged American activities in West Berlin is said to be in the making.

The Church

The regime has made new moves to split the Evangelical Church in East Germany from its leaders in West Berlin and West Germany. On 30 August, the East Berlin police president ordered Dr. Kurt Scharf, chairman of the All-German Evangelical Church synod and a resident of East Berlin, to cancel a synod meeting scheduled for the following day. At the same time, East German churchmen were forbidden to attend a synod meeting in West Berlin.

The regime followed up with a move to expel Dr. Scharf from East Berlin, on grounds that he had retained his West Berlin identity card, had protested against the sealing off

of West Berlin, and belonged to "an organization inimical to peace." The regime also refused to permit the provincial Berlin-Brandenburg synod to meet on 2 September to elect a successor to Bishop Otto Dibelius.

By these moves, the regime has effectively split the church into Eastern and Western halves. It may soon attempt to institute an East German "national" Evangelical Church.

West Berlin and West Germany

The US Mission characterizes the feelings of West Berliners as a combination of grim resolve to hang on and nervousness over where the next blow will fall. They find it especially difficult to adjust to the loss of the city's long-standing "special mission" in the East-West struggle--i.e., its role of "escape hatch," show window to the East, and meeting place of Germans from East and West. As alternatives, West Berlin leaders have already begun to stress further economic progress and development of West Berlin as a center of science and education. The mission doubts, however, whether in the long run any of the younger West Berliners will be able to resist the appeal of a "less complicated" life in West Germany.

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The Homeland Day rally was uneventful, with no interference from the East German regime. East Germany used similar meetings a year ago as a pretext for imposing restrictions on West German civilian access to West Berlin. West German Transport Minister Seehofer visited West Berlin and returned to Bonn on 2 September without incident, despite East German threats of "demonstrations" against his flight into Berlin on a Western commercial aircraft.

According to the West German newspaper Die Welt, only 300 West German firms have exhibits at the East German Leipzig Trade Fair from 3 to 10 September, as compared with 815 last year. Many large West German firms which had been represented for many years are conspicuously absent.

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21/19

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

14 September 1961

Washington

Dear

I am writing my part of the answer to your letter while here to discuss the programs with which your letter is concerned. While I may not follow your letter point by point in this response, I believe all items requested of me will be covered in the following categories into which this letter is organized:

- a. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin
- b. CIA Programs in Berlin
- c. Reorientation of the Berlin Base to Meet New Situation and Tasks

#### I. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin

The border between East and West Berlin has been converted into a Communist-style international border across which traffic in either direction is rigidly controlled. The unique asset of Berlin is, therefore, a thing of the past. But it is essential to bear two points in mind: traffic is still crossing the border in both directions, including West Berliners, West Germans, East Berliners, and almost any nationality you wish to name. Crossings number hundreds--total East and West, counting a round trip as two crossings--daily; and the unique nature of the Sector Border prior to 13 August means that there is no substitute for it in West Germany (or elsewhere) as a means of achieving access to East Germany. The border between the Federal Republic and East Germany is tightened up as part of the measures launched 13 August to (in our assessment) accomplish the division of Germany, and in another week or so a restricted zone will have been established along the entire FedRep-East German border to a depth of perhaps 25 to 35 miles, in addition to the erection of physical barriers at points judged by the East most vulnerable to black crossings.

While the border between West Berlin and East Germany is being converted into a plowed strip - barbed wire - watch towers - patrolled border, the border between East Berlin and East Germany is now virtually uncontrolled - a change of the past few days. In short: A West Berliner can visit East Berlin, with appropriate excuse (this varies but East-West traders, newsmen, students, and a few compassionate travelers are getting passes). Once in East Berlin, a suitably outfitted agent can presumably cache his West documents, and on East German documentation and suitable cover story travel into East Germany. We have been waiting for just such pattern to emerge from the chaotic and unpredictable administration of.

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border controls which has obtained until very recently, and will now begin to test in practice this presumed operational potential.

Refugees are still reaching West Berlin at a rate in excess of 30 or 40 a day. By contrast, only a little over 100 reached Bavaria in the period 13 to 31 August.

While not denying that there is a role for the agent to play in collection of imminence indicators, I believe we should not overemphasize this.

So the intelligence problem is still very much one of gathering political intelligence showing intentions too. This by way of lead-in to my conception of the intelligence collection missions of BOB:

a. Reactivate agents now out of touch with us. This involves courier missions to some agents; courier missions to deaddrop communications material and instructions; resupply missions to agents with S/W commo and pads. Our more than 100 agents in East Berlin and East Germany are probably a greater asset than anything we will ever be able to build up inside East Germany through new recruitments. They must be preserved, recontacted securely, in some cases reoriented (many, especially two of the ) may have great potential as U/W assets if we can get radios to them. Some of our West Berlin assets may be usable for resupply missions; and we will need to recruit support agents in West Berlin for contact, caching, and observation missions.

b. Recruit new sources for East German coverage. Opportunities appear to lie in East-West traders in touch with East German officials; in the contacts of West Berlin students with East Berlin students (taking due note of inherent political dangers and existing prohibitions on student operations); in non-Germans, especially nationals of the developing areas

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(who may be recruited in West Berlin and elsewhere) for their contacts with East Berliners (they currently have fairly easy access to East Berlin) or even as long-term agents for legal infiltration into East Germany probably as students; recruitment of East Berliners who visit West Berlin (at the moment a small and pretty hopeless category largely party faithful and railroaders but one which may expand); and CE operations (Chief of LfV Berlin told me 12 September his double agent operations are proceeding unhindered by the border changes.

c. Support operations by providing leads, case officers for recruitments, and command support from Berlin to recruits who return to East Germany.

d. Greatly expand our contacts among West Berlin newspaper, business, and professional circles for (a) reports on West Berlin morale and suggestions for possible CA operations to counteract bad morale; (b) leads to persons having contacts in the East; and (c) for their own eastern contacts. A few sources on West Berlin morale—we won't overdo it—will not bring us into conflict with State, and will provide us coverage now not available; the principal purpose of West Berlin contacts, though, will be as avenues to sources in the East.

While the above is doubtless not exhaustive, it represents a fair scale of operational opportunity remaining in Berlin, which will continue until and unless eastern authorities completely seal the border and prevent any contact between East and West Berlin.

## II. CA programs in Berlin.

I have had some reservations about various types of CA programs in Berlin which I have explained pretty fully to . . . Let me say by way of introduction that I do believe there is a field for CA operations, but that we must eschew the "gimmick" type operation for which we became so famous - via our groups - in years past. I would see three basic types of CA operations:

- a. Operations to harass the East German regime;
- b. Operations to dramatize the Berlin issue worldwide;
- c. Operations to bolster or maintain West Berlin morale.

In the category of harassment of the East German regime I include operations to deter the East German border guards from shooting fleeing refugees; operations encouraging defection of border guards; operations to bring factual news to the East Germans and otherwise undermine the control of the regime over the populace. . . . and I have discussed the possibilities of

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erecting billboards at the Sector border; of painting signs on buildings facing the East; and of setting up mobile projectors to project slogans and straight news (including facsimiles of West Berlin papers), on various types of screens. Screens may be buildings, or under some conditions the low cloud cover not unusual for Berlin at this time of year. I am having get information on projectors and plastic screen materials with the idea of building mobile projection trucks with the capability of projecting slides on a translucent plastic screen forming the side or back of the truck; such trucks would include a generator, and projection equipment to project on building sides, clouds, or billboards as well, and also could perhaps carry loudspeaker equipment. They could be used all around the border, including the West Berlin-East Germany border. The theme (other than straight news) most appealing to me at the moment is Willy Brandt's "Lass dich nicht zum Lumpen machen" as a message to the guards on the border, likely to be the only audience shortly after the truck arrives, since the authorities would certainly clear away any crowds in sight of such moving signs. Still, the border guards are a good target for campaigns such as the current one offering 10,000 marks for the identity of the murderer of the refugee who tried to swim the Teltow Canal. This program would be done by the Senat, as we see it, with our support.

The idea of a second TV channel is a good one, too. TV will reach East Berlin, because no special aerial will be needed at such close range.

More news signs like the one at Potsdamer Platz would be good, too, but will take a long time to construct and will probably be seen by very few East Berliners, since the Eastern authorities will clear out the people in range.

A somewhat minor point, but worth doing I think, would be transmitting some straight news and music program (perhaps VOA has one suitable) over AFN Berlin from 0100 (when AFN signs off) until 0300 or even until 0600 when AFN comes on again. State has recommended this recently, to counteract the current "pirating" of the frequency by Radio Moscow English language programs, which come in loud and clear on the AFN Berlin frequency as the "Star Spangled Banner" fades away. I suspect Radio Moscow is aiming at East German listeners to AFN as much as anything, and feel we should deprive them of this free ride.

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Operations dramatizing the Berlin issue world-wide will show an upturn shortly, I hope, partly through greater concentration of on the Berlin theme (and expansion of its normal production) to include one to three pictures a day, two picture features a week, all to an expanded mailing list which will shortly include journalists who have visited Berlin under any one of the several past and current programs stimulating such visits. [ ] is clearly interested in using his facilities to produce and spread Berlin items, which we will encourage. I think we can indeed do much more in this direction, and do think we should not discount the possibilities of worldwide interest in the variety of dramatic events characteristic of the current Berlin situation. Pictures are the big thing, I believe, and I feel [ ] can (and shortly will) do much, much more in this line.

The plans for making Berlin a cultural center, for building up specialized industries, and even for establishing one or more technical commissions of the UN in Berlin (I would suggest the EC, perhaps UNESCO, perhaps WHO) are all of great importance, although our own role as KUBARK in these may in some instances not be particularly large. Willy Brandt, partly for election impact and partly because it is needed has started a program asking for still further tax advantages to Berlin residents (among other provisions) to help induce people from the FedRep to move to West Berlin. The city will need to stop the previous outflow of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 annually of its working force (up to now replenished by refugees), and achieved an inflow resulting in a net gain in working force annually, to maintain vitality. Moreover, right now West Berlin critically needs over 20,000 workers to replace the East-West Grenzgaenger of whose services the city was suddenly deprived on 13 August. Thus the economic proposals face some formidable initial problems, but should be pursued. Mayor Brandt's plans include proposals startlingly similar to your Long Range Plan, which we shall certainly encourage. Perhaps now would be a good time to lay out the proposal to Shep Stone and ask him to pursue it with the Senat, keeping us informed and hollering for help if it were needed.

The above is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of actions most, if not all, of which would appear already to have policy approval. Let me urge, therefore, that [ ] indeed be sent to Berlin, because I cannot possibly run the base and a large CA program without [ ] and without any CA officer. [ ] is already well on his way to entrenching himself in Berlin, and will be just what we need there.

III. Reorientation of Berlin Base: [ ] and I have spent all our spare moments on the dual questions of reorienting the BOB effort and selecting officers for assignment elsewhere in Germany. Morale is, as you note, admirably high in Berlin Base, and most (or all) the officers currently want to stay there. But I doubt that there will be enough opportunities to justify the current number of officers, nor that the best talents of many of the officers now on hand will be utilized under the current conditions. The result, in the near future, will be a drop in morale, I think, if some officers do not soon get new assignments. There is the usual aura of uncertainty hanging over the base, and I want to announce as soon as possible the nature of the tasks BOB will do, and the nature of other programs being established in light of the threatening situation, to which BOB officers will be assigned. Every sign gives me reason to think that all officers selected for the proposed "Task Force" will be enthusiastic about it. of course, has the respect of every officer on the base, and beyond this the officers in Berlin Base now want to do something about the threat to Berlin, which this proposed assignment will provide them every opportunity of doing. Sending eight officers on TDY in the next week or so will avoid the occurrence of any stagnant period at the base (which, believe me, there has as yet not been) between the time of activating alternate communications with agents, the initial phase of which is now largely completed, and the decisions on further activities in Berlin and elsewhere.

I am thinking in terms of a base of about 75 people in Berlin. This will permit diversion of more than 20 case officers to other assignments, principally to the paramilitary and perhaps the black radio operations. Some officers will definitely be transferred from Berlin [ ] while others will tackle the "Task Force" in TDY status at least initially. Some officers will definitely be selected for transfer out of Berlin; others can only be selected after decisions are made with respect to the plans, [ ] is carrying back, and criteria can be established for selecting the officers.

My present plans also call for a simplification of Base structure. While tentative, plans now call for a CA branch of six or seven officers under [ ] a positive intelligence branch under [ ] (who will also be Deputy Chief of Base if [ ] leaves), and a CE Branch under [ ]. Firm recommendations will be along in a matter of days. A small Coordination and Liaison Branch under [ ], and an expanded Intelligence Support Staff under [ ] to exploit the numerous sources of useful information on Berlin aside from BOB agents, are the other main operational components. A case officer strength of around 30 can be achieved with the total strength figure of 75. Obviously, some personnel shifts are going to take a little diplomacy, but the urgency of the situation will obviate serious problems, I believe. I agree completely with [ ] comment that the necessity of change will be recognized.

Finally to close what has become a rather long letter, let me state that all of us in Berlin, West Berliners, U.S. Army, and State Department alike, feel most strongly that no amount of propaganda, no clever deception operations, can make any real difference to the Berlin situation. Our policy stance will provide us the support of the West Berliners and the West Germans, or lose it. What is crucially important now is firm and unfaltering response. We must maintain uncontrolled air access. And unquestionably the greatest factor in maintaining West Berlin morale beyond the uncompromising maintenance of access is the presence of American troops in numbers sufficient to ensure that any attempt to take West Berlin by force, conventional or unconventional, must reckon with meeting and subduing American troops, with all the implications that entails. I do not think we have enough troops in Berlin yet; we cannot keep a very extensive level of patrolling going with the forces at hand. I have suggested to General Watson every time he asks me (which is once a week at least) what more we can do in Berlin that the troops should be at the border, and more troops should be here. It's way out of my field, but I would suggest the Army rotate a combat group to Berlin every three weeks or so, and I do mean by road. That way an additional group would be in Berlin, and the soldiers would get valuable training. I suggest the Air Force, too, increase the flight of military aircraft to Berlin, even if they don't need to carry anything in or out just now. Increased flights would afford pilot training for Air Force officers who may soon be flying the route regularly, and would sound a note with the Berliners, valuable psychologically, of our determination — a determination backed up by readiness.

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17. S.: Now I will relate to you the report which I have prepared and which you should immediately report to your superiors. VARENTSOV's birthday party was celebrated not on the 15th but on Saturday 16th in order to permit more time. On the 15th September at 0900 hours I met VARENTSOV at the Leningrad Railroad station where he had just arrived from Leningrad. After having left you I had given him his razor but on the 15th at the railroad station I brought him a package containing the cognac, about which I will tell you in a moment, and which has great significance, as well as the rocket-shaped lighter and the cigarette box with inscriptions thereon. He kissed me as he greeted me at the station. He was also met there by General Lieut. VOZNESSINSKIY and General Lieut. NIKOLAYEV. VARENTSOV had been in Leningrad because a Party conference was held there and he was elected as the delegate to the 22nd Party Congress, and very probably VARENTSOV at this 22nd Party Congress will be elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He will be elected as a candidate or a member of the CC, in other words he will receive a promotion along the Party line. Having given him the packages I went to the Committee, whose car I had at my disposal, while he went to his Directorate where he was greeted and where a ceremony took place in which he was awarded the Order of Lenin. He told me to be sure to come on the 16th at 16.00 hours together with my entire family, including my daughter and mother, to his dacha. He said that he had invited many people but many would not be there because they were out of town concerned with military matters. Who and with that military matters I will relate in a moment.

18. S.: He said that the Minister MALINOVSKIY would be there and CHURAYEV Viktor Mikhailovich, who is a member of the Central Committee and the Head of the Party organisation of the RFSSR - one of KHRUSHCHEV's right hand men. Gen. Polk. FOMIN will be there, Gen. Polk. SAMSONOV, Gen. Pol. G.S. KARIOFILLI, RYABCHIKOV, a Professor of Chemistry and Lieut. Gen. SEMENOV, who was VARENTSOV's Deputy on the First Ukrainian Front. Incidentally one of VARENTSOV's two present deputies, the one who replaced COFFE is also Gen. Lieut. SEMENOV, that is a namesake of the other. In a moment I will tell

..../you the details

APPROVE



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you the details of the party. Since I left you in England I have had the opportunity of speaking with VALENTINOV, ZASORIN, BUZINOV and many others. This is what I must relate to you at once.

19. S.: In the beginning of October this year there will begin extensive general (vse-obshchiye) manoeuvres. There were never such manoeuvres in the history of the Soviet Army. This is because all headquarters of all military districts will participate and also all headquarters of groups of forces. Even all rear services in the military districts will participate in these manoeuvres. In other words every Army formation will execute its assigned mission in these manoeuvres just as they would be called upon to do in case there was a war. In addition all headquarters of all countries of People's Democracies will also take part in these manoeuvres. These strategic manoeuvres will begin in early October and will take place throughout the entire USSR and throughout all of the countries of People's Democracies all based on combatting a hypothetical enemy in the direction of Germany.

20. S.: I will now try to explain to you in detail why these manoeuvres will take place and what their objective is. Later I will tell you who, why and when gave me this information. These manoeuvres are called strategic because they involve very great territorial depth and all military districts and all groups of forces will participate as well as all the headquarters of the countries of the People's Democracies. These manoeuvres will continue for a period of <sup>up to a</sup> month. The objective of these manoeuvres is to examine everything as a whole and to determine what units have specific capabilities. They will examine who can best fulfil offensive missions shock action, defensive operations and to examine the state of training and combat readiness of all units, as well as their joint action. Through these manoeuvres deficiencies in training can be corrected and experience in joint operations gained. But this is only one purpose, the second purpose is to have these huge forces in a state of combat readiness exactly at the time that the Peace Treaty with East Germany will be signed, so that if any difficulties occur immediately after the signing of this Treaty they would be in a position to strike a heavy blow. In other words what KHRUSHCHEV wants to do is to backstop with actual large-scale military preparations

..../camouflaged

# which will be signed right after the  
Germans.

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camouflaged as manoeuvres his signing of the Peace Treaty with East Germany.

21. S.: KHRUSHCHEV considers that if NATO swallows the second pill and he considers that the first pill, which was the closing of the borders of East and West Berlin, has already been swallowed, - that is the action of 13th August - incidentally, I know about this closing four days before the fact and I wanted to pass this information on to you but had no means for doing this, since the phone call arrangement was only good for Monday and this took place on a different day. I did not want to risk putting the information into the dead drop and calling by chance. We will have to work out a system that will permit me to pass critical information to you quickly in future.

22. S.: KHRUSHCHEV, his Central Committee and his government plan to do this - on the 17th October to open the 22nd Party Congress. This conference we should call Conference "Aggressive". That is because a very aggressive attitude will be prevalent, all sorts of propaganda speeches are being prepared asking decisive action against imperialism and colonialism. And by firing up the Congress with such speeches KHRUSHCHEV hopes to untie his hands for aggressive action by placing the responsibility for the decisions which support KHRUSHCHEV and his government's position on the Congress. Even if a war takes place after the Congress, KHRUSHCHEV can refer to this situation as a decision of the Congress. For Bolsheviks the Congress represents their programme for the immediate future. All secretaries of Central Committees will be present at this congress as well as secretaries of the Parties of other People's Democracies and Communist Parties from capitalist countries as well, many of the latter will come secretly. It will be of interest to see how the Communist leaders throughout the world react to the concept of military action at this time as proposed by the leading Communist Party, namely that of the Soviet Union. I suggest for your consideration and that of our leaders how advantageous it would be to introduce some sort of split in views at this congress. It is important that there be no unanimity of views between all of the Communist leaders of the various countries.

23. S.: Already there have been orders issued that during the month of

..../October no //

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October no foreigners should be admitted to the Soviet Union. All MOSCOW hotels are now being retained for the use of Central Committee members and Party delegates. They are even fumigating the rooms to be sure that foreigners previously living there have not left bacteriological contamination. Even in our Committee we have turned down all requests for foreign visitors during the month of October by saying there is no room, and that they will be busy with the Party Congress. This will continue until the 15th November since many Party delegates will stay after the Congress to attend the celebration and parade of 7th November. In addition they are now preparing to set up very strict counter intelligence procedures in MOSCOW and the Moscow oblast during this time. Therefore, I request you to have all of our agent operations in MOSCOW suspend activity during this period. It will be very difficult to work in MOSCOW during this time and the KGB from other cities have also been called in.

24. S.: Let me review. Immediately after the Party Conference KHRUSHCHEV wants to sign the Peace Treaty; at the time of the signing he wants to have all possible military units in a state of combat readiness. If necessary he will strike. If it is only a local attack by us then it will be parried, but of course if a larger conflict develops that is why combat readiness is needed. KHRUSHCHEV, our General Staff and the GRU know perfectly well that secret preparations in modern times are not possible due to intelligence techniques. But under the guise of manoeuvres, concerning which he will insist that they are only manoeuvres, their extent and duration can easily be extended. If the allies swallow the second pill and say "very well since you have signed a treaty with East Germany we will deal with East Germany", then the strain will be relieved and the manoeuvres will terminate and the result of these will still serve as a valuable training exercise for joint operations. If not the powder is still dry and military action can be employed. This is the dual purpose for which these manoeuvres are planned for the early days of October.

25. S.: Right now MOSCOW is boiling with all kinds of representatives from the headquarters of the countries of People's Democracies, both in ...../military and

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military and civilian dress. I have seen them everywhere and anyone can spot them. Secondly, all prominent military commanders are in the field with troops, for example, at VARENTSOV's birthday party his deputy PYRSKIY was not present.

26. S.: There are two deputies, PYRSKIY and SEMENOV, who replaced GOFFS. PYRSKIY is now at NOVAYA ZEMLYA where they are experimenting with atomic detonations. There is a large base there on which are rockets with atomic warheads, the details of which I will give you shortly. The other deputy SEMENOV is now attending the atomic bomb tests in Central Asia. Here is how I found this out. At VARENTSOV's party, Viktor Mikhailovich CHURAYEV asked VARENTSOV - where is PYRSKIY? and MALINOVSKIY said that PYRSKIY is doing a fine job in running the tests and the training programme at NOVAYA ZEMLYA.

27. S.: I can now report to you about the atomic tests being conducted now since KHRUSHCHEV felt that it was impossible for him not to run these tests. These tests have two phases; in the past years the first phase consisted of testing the individual TNT equivalent weapons. They were raised on towers, from masts and dropped from aircraft. But now KHRUSHCHEV and his military commanders are testing nuclear detonations delivered by rockets. This is phase II. These tests are conducted by means of firing a rocket with a conventional charge against the selected target and then assembling an atomic warhead and firing it against the same target. Both MALINOVSKIY and VARENTSOV answered CHURAYEV that Gen. Polk. PYRSKIY is now at NOVAYA ZEMLYA running the tests and will continue to remain there because there will be additional tests.

28. S.: There is a huge rocket launching base at NOVAYA ZEMLYA which is equipped to fire the R-12 and the R-14 rockets. There are no R-11s there; this was all told to me by BUZINOV. Now with respect to these rockets the R-12 is already adopted and is being serially produced. Its range is two and a half thousand kilometres. The R-14 is now being prepared for serial production but it has not yet been produced in quantity. The range of the R-14 is four and a half thousand kilometres. Both ranges I have given are those for these rockets carrying an atomic warhead. Of course the ranges are greater with conventional warheads.

...../G. Approximately

26 September 1961

C-48

1.3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Conversation with Mr. Helms Re  
 [REDACTED] Report on Large-Scale  
 Soviet Military Preparations

1.3(a)(4)

1. When Mr. Osborn and I were discussing the above report with Mr. Helms, upon its receipt yesterday afternoon, I told Mr. Helms we should expect renewed consumer questions about the possibility of deception. I pointed out that the [REDACTED] material had not only been accepted by most of our consumers, but that the material was: a) extremely costly in terms of Soviet security; and b) apparently inconsistent with any discernible Soviet policy purposes. However, I said we must face up to the fact that [REDACTED] was now in a key position to give us information vitally affecting our own reaction to recent Soviet moves. For example, [REDACTED] could assure us that all the preparations we would be seeing over the next few weeks were, indeed, part of the maneuvers already described, in which case the Soviets would be able to take aggressive military action without alerting our indications mechanism. On the other hand, at some critical juncture, [REDACTED] might tell us that the Soviets were now ready to strike unless we made significant concessions, even though, in fact, the entire Soviet effort was bluff.

1.3(a)(4)

2. Mr. Helms agreed that such questions would probably arise, but that we should take the position that the consumers themselves would have to make up their minds as to the answer. He said all we could vouch for was that, from strictly an operational standpoint, we had been unable to fault [REDACTED] and could see nothing in the operational and CE aspects of the case which would cause us to question the validity of the information being supplied.

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
 31 MAR 1992

JOHN W. MAURY  
 Chief, SR Division

JJM/r

1.3(a)(4)

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TS 12897-91  
Limited Distribution  
SNE R 10/1/61  
15 October 1961

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

# SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

Supplement SNE R 10-61

- Possibility of early radical action
- Attitude toward negotiations



NOTE: This is the final version of the estimate and additional  
text will not be circulated.

ACCOUNTABLE DOCUMENT

RETURN TO

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Central Intelligence Agency

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VII-13

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TS # 142397-c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

5 October 1961 2/18/94

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-10/1-61: SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

HRP

94-3

#### THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis over the next few months, with particular reference to reported Soviet intentions to take radical unilateral action during this period.

#### BACKGROUND

A recent report from a source, judged at this time to be reliable, states that Soviet and Satellite forces will be brought to a high state of combat readiness in exercises "of unprecedented scope" beginning in early October and lasting for one month. This source supplies many details supporting this theme, citing personal observation and the remarks of senior officials, mostly military officers. He reports learning from a senior commander that Khrushchev's present policy is to hold back, putting the brakes on international tensions until the Party Congress, at which time he will abruptly go over to a highly

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militant line. According to this story, a separate peace treaty with East Germany will then be signed immediately after the Congress. Without specifically so stating, the report implies that a challenge to Allied access will follow promptly upon the signing of the treaty. It is thought that perhaps the West will "swallow the second pill" (the first having been the border closure in Berlin); if not, Bloc forces, already at a high state of readiness, will "strike first if the situation warrants."\*

THE ESTIMATE

1. The fourth quarter is normally the peak of the annual military training cycle in the USSR and Eastern Europe. In addition, there is an unusual stress on readiness at the present time, and the 25 September announcement of exercises by the Warsaw Pact forces suggests that these will be on a larger scale than on any previous occasion. Such preparations are clearly intended to convince the West of Communist military strength, readiness, and determination in the Berlin crisis and to increase pressure on the West either to make concessions or to acquiesce

\* We have examined closely the possibility that the source could be, wittingly or unwittingly, a channel for deception material. Our present judgment, based mainly on the sensitivity and volume of the material he is providing, is that this is unlikely.

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in Communist encroachments. They are also aimed at strengthening the USSR's military posture for the period of crisis and uncertainty which the Soviets foresee. But the preparations of which we are at present aware from all sources of information are not of such a scope and nature as to support a conclusion that the USSR is "peaking" all its forces for general war in the near future.

2. On the basis of his previous reporting and independent confirmation of portions of this report, we accept the source's statements concerning measures of military preparedness as correct in many although not in all respects. He is not in a position, however, to report reliably or completely on deliberations and decisions of the highest military and political bodies in Moscow. His statements concerning a decision to sign a separate treaty in October and, if conditions warrant, to strike an initial military blow, appear to us to fall into the category of speculation arising from knowledge he has acquired about contingency military planning.

3. It is evident that the Soviets must have contingency plans for the next phases of the Berlin crisis, but we doubt strongly that the USSR has made any irrevocable decisions

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concerning the timing of a separate treaty and of unilateral steps thereafter against the status quo in Berlin. We continue to believe that the USSR regards negotiations as the least risky method of advancing toward its objectives, and also that Khrushchev still hopes that the threat of unilateral action will force the Allies to make at least some concessions to his demands. And, if these hopes fail to materialize, he has at his disposal a wide range of unilateral actions, each of which, he believes, is limited enough to create only a minimal risk of forceful Western response, yet each of which can bring the USSR a step closer to its aims.

4. Currently the USSR is seeking to display a more positive attitude toward negotiations; it has ceased to reiterate deadlines for a separate treaty and has indicated some flexibility in its approach to negotiations. These maneuvers are designed in part to appear responsive to the calls for peaceful compromise emanating from the Belgrade Conference and the General Assembly. They are also intended to encourage those sectors of opinion which are urging the Allies to consider concessions to Soviet demands. Perhaps most important, they are intended to probe the Allied position in order to determine whether negotiations are

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likely to bring some progress toward their objectives. We continue to believe that the Soviets prefer to enter negotiations before undertaking major unilateral steps or signing a separate treaty with the GDR.

5. Along with this, however, Khrushchev has several times voiced concern that the Allies would use negotiations merely as a device for stalling. He recognizes that, once formal talks are under way, any move on his part to break them off and turn to unilateral measures might solidify NATO unity and forfeit the support for his Berlin policy which he has tried to develop among the non-aligned nations. However, he would feel it necessary to respond positively to a formal Allied tender of negotiations. But he would also attempt to assure himself in preliminary discussions that some advance toward his objectives would result from such a conference. If he felt that the prospects for this were poor, he would probably proceed at some point with a separate peace treaty, in part as a means of bringing the Allies under greater pressure to talk on Soviet terms.

6. If the Soviets decide to make a major unilateral move against Allied rights in Berlin, they would clearly wish to be in a state of maximum military readiness at the time, both to

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deter the Allies from a forceful reaction and to be prepared for any eventuality should deterrence fail. They recognize the dangers of a situation in which the West would feel itself confronted with the alternatives of deep humiliation or a military showdown, because they realize that such a situation might escape their control. They have deliberately left unclear the question of whether they would, immediately after a peace treaty back up with force their demands for new access procedures. The source's references to "striking first" are ambiguous and could mean any level of military action, possibly undertaken only after a judgment was reached that the West was about to resort to force locally. We think it very unlikely, however, that the Soviets would "strike first" in the sense of launching a major military offensive, unless they were convinced that a large-scale Western attack was inevitable and imminent.

7. In conclusion, we believe that the course of action outlined in the present report -- signature of a separate peace treaty in late October followed by a prompt challenge to Allied access -- has been construed by the source and others from their knowledge of military preparations. We do not believe that firm decisions of this kind have been taken by the top Soviet

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leadership. But the considerations outlined above do suggest that the higher state of military readiness to be achieved in October/November will make this a favorable period, from the Soviet standpoint, for limited unilateral moves against Western rights in Berlin, if their prospects for advancing toward their objectives at that time via negotiations appear dim.

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<b>DISPATCH</b>		<b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
TO	INFO	DISPATCHER FILE NO.	
FROM	Chief of Base, Berlin	DATE	6 November 1961
SUBJECT		RE "GJ" - (CHECK "T" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED	For Your Information.	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
REFERENCE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
		INDEXING CAN BE ADDED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. In the weeks since the August 13th seal-off of the sector border, the East German regime has taken further steps to break off any but the most essential contacts with the West and to transform East Germany from the most Western-spirited Soviet satellite into a state governed on distinctly Stalinist lines. Apart from erecting the physical impediments of concrete walls, barbed wire fences, and deep trenches to prevent intercourse between the two parts of Berlin (and the two parts of Germany), the regime is taking internal measures clearly indicating its extreme apprehension about its ability to control the populace now that the safety valve - the possibility of fleeing to the West - has been all but cut. The move most indicative of regime anxiety was the tremendous drive conducted to recruit young people to join Zou's military and paramilitary services. Every form of pressure, including assignment to disgraceful jobs at lower pay and even physical beating, has been applied to "enlist" youth between the ages of 18 and 23. Considering the low political reliability of this age group in the past (this age group comprises nearly half the refugee flow of the past two years) it cannot be imagined that the regime expects to forge reliable military forces from these unwilling recruits - at least in very short order - and the measure thus appears to be a move to enhance internal security of the regime by imposing military discipline and punishment upon this age group and transplanting youth to unfamiliar surroundings thus breaking up former acquaintances and contacts. A further measure of internal control has been the institution of forced labor for those the regime considers not employed in the "interests of the state", especially applied to the 30,000 or more East Berliners and East Germans who held jobs in West Berlin until 13 August ("border crossers") and who have since been ordered to jobs largely of a menial nature throughout the East Zone. Arrests of persons accused of anti-regime remarks and draconian sentences for acts considered hostile to the state are everyday affairs; several instances have been recorded of life imprisonment sentences imposed on teenagers for defying East German authorities, in particular for helping others escape from East Germany.

FORM 10-53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, EXCEPT FORMS 10-53 AND 10-54 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1
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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
<p>3. In the past month, the regime has shifted its attention to industrial production. Now emphasis is being placed upon recruiting young people for jobs in industry and a "voluntary" campaign is in full swing whose aim is to get greater productivity from the available labor force. According to a public statement by a principal East German official, the labor force of East Germany has declined by 200,000 since mid-1958. There is definite indication that East German industrial production has at least in some sectors dropped below the levels reached early in 1961. Consequently, the "production appeal" now under way must have as its first goal the restoration of previous production levels. Letters from all parts of East Germany suggest a public apathy which is very likely leading to a slow-down in industry contributing still further to the problem of maintaining production already made difficult by the enormous refugee flow of this spring and summer and the withdrawal of useful elements of the labor force to military and paramilitary services in August and September.</p>		<p>DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.</p>
<p>4. Throughout the East Zone the impression gained from letters, covert sources, and the observations of U. S. Military Mission personnel driving through the area is one of depression approaching despair. The Military Mission officers report that streets are almost deserted by day and night. People are evidently remaining at home except for absolutely necessary shopping tours and for the periods when they are at work or attending mandatory party indoctrination sessions. Shortages of food and many types of consumer goods have been reported everywhere in the Zone. Measures introduced raising prices on many consumer goods immediately following the 17 September "local elections" in East Germany contributed still further to the deep-seated discontent of the populace. Isolated instances of resistance have been reported; one of the most recent developments has been a wave of barn burnings on the collective farms. But there continues to be no evidence of an organized resistance nor of a spirit of desperation in the populace which would conceivably lead to spontaneous uprisings on a wide scale. The spirit of resistance to the regime is probably still on the rise among the East German populace but it is not likely to be touched off by anything short of active military operations conducted by the West.</p>		
<p>5. The construction of the wall along the sector border and the successful "sealing in" of the East German populace has had nearly as profound an effect upon the morale of West Berlin residents as it has had upon the East German populace. West Berliners have become extremely apprehensive since 13 August that the Western Allies are seeking a settlement with the Soviet Union which maintains Allied access to West Berlin but which agreement psychologically and physically reduces the viability of West Berlin. The West Berliner was profoundly disappointed when the West failed to prevent construction of the wall dividing Berlin, and his disappointment has become the more vocal and critical of the West as indications have accumulated suggesting that the East German military forces which first closed the border on 13 August had no ammunition in their weapons and were prepared to withdraw at the slightest sign that the West would take military action to prevent the sector border seal-off. It can, of course, never be established initially what might have happened had the Western Allies physically intervened and prevented the construction of the barbed wire fences along the sector border on 13 August. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the Soviets were bluffing and it seems highly likely that Soviet forces would have appeared on the sector border had Allied military forces moved up. Had the Soviets moved up, the border would still have been closed, but physical barriers might conceivably have been constructed some</p>		

FORM 10-67 53a

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.  
REPLACES FORMS 51-68, 51-69 AND 51-70 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
<p>distance inside East Berlin rather than being emplaced directly upon the line between the two sectors. There was no satisfactory way of stopping the flood of refugees from East Germany except the closure of the sector border (short of abandoning the use of East Berlin as the capital of East Germany). At the rate the refugee flow was mounting in the first two weeks of August, there is little doubt that another month of refugee flow would have caused the collapse of the East German economy. It must be supposed, therefore, that the Soviets, having at last made the decision to close the sector border, were prepared to close it with their own forces if necessary.</p> <p>6. The actions by the West since the 15th of August have made principal contributions to bolstering morale in West and East Berlin alike. The first move was the visit to West Berlin of the Vice President of the United States and the transfer of an additional battle group to West Berlin on 20 August. This expression of the commitment of the United States in West Berlin was of tremendous significance in averting a crisis of confidence among the civil populace of West Berlin. The arrival of General Clay in general had a strong positive impact upon the populace of East and West Berlin alike, and his presence has been especially hailed by West Berliners following the demonstration of determination accompanied by a modest show of military force carried out at Friedrichstrasse during the week of 22 October, for which actions General Clay is basically credited here. The actions forcing symbolic entrance into East Berlin of American civilians in vehicles bearing U. S. Army Europe license plates culminated on 27 October with the appearance in East Berlin of Soviet tanks which for a 16-hour period confronted U. S. tanks at Friedrichstrasse over a distance of approximately 200 yards. This tangible Soviet recognition of its responsibilities in East Berlin did much to take away the initiative from the Soviets in the Berlin question. There can be little doubt that the prestige of the Soviets (and most certainly of the East German regime) has suffered a great loss and it can only be anticipated that the East will be most anxious to regain the ground it has lost. The appearance of Soviet tanks and personnel at Friedrichstrasse is all the more significant because it appears clear that the Soviets doubt that the East German forces will be reliable in an active military encounter in East Berlin if - as is most likely - an uprising of the East Berlin populace occurs. Soviet forces in the center of East Berlin are therefore probably at hand to put down a civil uprising. It seems most unlikely that the Soviets believe that the Americans and Western Allies intend to conduct actual military operations inside East Berlin.</p> <p>7. From an operational standpoint, the period since the sector border closure has been one of intensive assessment of totally new operation conditions - the first fundamental change in operational conditions at Berlin Base since its founding, arising from the impossibility henceforth of crossing the sector border without submitting to Eastern controls. It has been a source of tremendous satisfaction that we have been able to continue to maintain contact with more than 25 of our agent assets via previously established alternate communications channels. The foresight and professional skill of Base officers had prepared the great majority of important Base operations for just such a contingency as we have faced since 13 August, and two-way communications, while slow (and a scant substitute for personal meetings), have permitted us to maintain intelligence</p>		
FORM 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REFERENCE FORMS 510, 511, AND 512 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">             DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.           </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 10px;">             DISCUSSION           </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 10px;">             X CONTINUED           </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-left: 10px;">             PAGE NO. 3           </div>



CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
<p>collection activities through many Base assets despite the border closure. At least as many more agents of Berlin Base are scheduled for re-activation as far as we can arrange re-contact, re-supply, and in some cases communications training missions into East Berlin and East Germany on their behalf. Berlin Base operations into East Berlin and East Germany are now entirely legal travel operations, there is no practical way to conduct black operations into East Berlin in the face of physical barriers and patrols on the border. Nonetheless, a considerable traffic of West Germans and foreigners continues between East and West Berlin and a number of successful operations have already been carried out to support our agent assets in place in the East. We have also turned our attention more directly to tactical intelligence in direct support of the U. S. Commander, Berlin, and have been quite successful in maintaining a coverage of populace temper and significant events in East Berlin in the past few weeks.</p> <p>As the same time that we have been engaged in an adjustment of our operational methods to the new situation, we have been undertaking a reorganization of the Base in line with the requirement imposed upon us to create an operational element in West Germany to prepare agent assets for use in the event military hostilities break out over the Berlin question. A total of 20 staff personnel have been transferred from Berlin Base to this new unit, including the former Deputy Chief of Base and one of the operational branch chiefs. In addition, eight officers have been made available for other assignments in the German Station. The Base structure has been simplified somewhat by combining the four operational branches engaged in intelligence collection into two branches under the Deputy for Operations. A separate Cover/Action Branch has been set up which has been staffed almost entirely with officers already at Berlin Base diverted from intelligence collection activities. The CA Branch is currently engaged largely in propaganda and other psychological warfare operations aimed both at interpreting the Berlin crisis to audiences throughout the world and to bolstering the morale of the West Berliners. Attention is also being given to the possibilities for harassing Soviet and East German authorities in East Germany. The new Base organization is now beginning to work together as a team in a gratifyingly effective manner. The intelligence opportunities in Berlin continue to be very great and a slight relaxation of East German regulations, which would permit some East Germans to visit West Berlin, might well provide us with more opportunities for intelligence activities than the current Base strength could handle. While the 13th of August found Berlin Base at a low point in managerial strength and continuity, the transition period has now been completed and the Base is solidly entrenched with the local command and highly active in the intelligence and political action fields.</p>		
FORM 100-33a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORM 100-33a AND 100-33b WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
<p>100-33a</p>		<p>100-33b</p>

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ULX-77-1035  
#9

TS# 185467-a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Survivability of West Berlin\*

ASSUMPTION: SOVIET BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN IN  
RETALIATION FOR US ACTIONS IN CUBA

1. West Berlin is economically prepared for a total blockade.

We estimate that existing stocks of critical items are sufficient to maintain the physical well-being of the West Berlin population for at least six months. With respect to particular categories of critical supplies, we estimate:

FOOD: At least six months (with selective rationing)

FUEL: About 1 year  
(Coal)

MEDICINES: Six months

INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL: Sufficient to maintain employment for 4-5 months.

\* This memorandum has been coordinated with the representative of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Declassified by 95377  
date 6 APR 1978

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2. The critical factor, however, is not physical or economic but psychological. Everything would depend on the context of the Soviet move, and how quickly and forcefully the US reacted. A total and uncontested blockade would cause the West Berliners to lose all hope in a matter of weeks. A blockade contested by a successful airlift would probably relieve initial apprehension and sustain morale for a few months. Over a longer period, however, morale would deteriorate rapidly in the absence of a reasonable expectation that the US would break the blockade. The West Berliner's would become extraordinarily sensitive to, and suspicious of any indication from either side that the Cuban crisis might produce an accommodation at their expense.

*Abbot Smith*  
ABBOT SMITH  
Acting Chairman

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